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INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades we have experienced a revolution in residen-
tial landlord-tenant law. The residential tenant, long the stepchild of
the law, has now become its ward and darling. Tenants' rights have
increased dramatically; landlords' rights have decreased dramatically.
Part I of this article describes the extent of the revolution, Part II its
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causes, and Part III its consequences. Part IV evaluates the desirability
of most of these changes.
This article draws several conclusions. First, the structure of the
residential landlord-tenant relation has radically changed. A large
number of doctrines have been fundamentally revised. Second, most of
the changes were caused not by a deepening crisis in rental housing, but
rather by social, political, and intellectual currents that emerged in the
sixties. One change, however, most rent control legislation, was enacted
in response to an economic force-inflation-rather than to social or
intellectual developments. Third, the detrimental impact of rent con-
trol on tenant welfare predominantly affects future tenants and those
persons unable to vote. This explains why over 200 communities have
adopted rent control despite its generally adverse effect on housing.
Fourth, despite their widespread use, vacancy rates are worthless as in-
dicators of housing shortages. Judges and analysts who have relied on
them have been led astray. Finally, each individual change in the law
must be judged independently with respect to its effect on the availabil-
ity and cost of housing. For example, although the warranty of habita-
bility applied to latent defects promotes the efficient provision of
housing, the same warranty applied to patent defects retards it. The key
question is, Does the law reflect what the parties would have bargained
for with full knowledge and experience? To the extent that it does, the
law promotes the efficient provision of housing.
I
THE REVOLUTION DESCRIBED
The "transformation" of American landlord-tenant law' has in-
trigued many scholars. Ten years ago, Professor Donahue discerned "an
extraordinary ferment" in this area of law.2 More recently, Professor
Berger suggests that the business of providing rental housing has come
to be treated like a public utility, but without any provision for the pro-
tections that public utilities customarily enjoy. 3 Professor Michelman
suggests that the law now often recognizes a property right in a tenant
to remain on the premises even after the lease has expired, and argues
that this newly fashioned property right is entitled to constitutional pro-
tection.4 In his comprehensive article Professor Cunningham views the
I See Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C.L. REV. 503,
575 (1982) (during past two decades, landlord-tenant law has "escaped from the realm of
private ordering, in which the stronger party typically has the advantage, and has become
subject to regulation 'in the public interest' ").
2 Donahue, Change in the American Law of Landlordand Tenant, 37 MOD. L. REv. 242, 242
(1974).
3 Berger, The New Residential Tenang Lau-Are Landlords Public Utilities?, 60 NEB. L.
REv. 707 (1981).
4 Michelman, Propery as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1113-14
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landlord-tenant relationship as having moved from one based on "con-
tract" to one based on "status.' 5 Perhaps Professor Abbott was the first
to recognize recent developments in this area for what they are: a
"revolution." 6
The doctrinal changes in landlord-tenant law can fairly be termed
"revolutionary" for several reasons. First, some of the more well-known
changes strike at the core of the landlord-tenant relationship, both in
legal and practical terms. Traditionally, courts considered the land-
lord's rights to determine the amount of rent, to gain possession at the
end of the term, and to choose tenants, and the right of the parties to
decide on the extent of landlord services as basic rights that rested on
fundamental legal principles. Yet recently lawmakers have significantly
modified these basic rights as well as a large number of less central doc-
trines. Second, both courts and legislatures have significantly partici-
pated in the revolution. Third, the change has been rapid (particularly
during the brief period from 1968 to 1973) and widespread. Almost
every jurisdiction, despite different demographic, economic, and social
conditions, has adopted these modifications. Fourth, and most impor-
tant, almost all of the changes have favored the tenant as against the
landlord. What were the causes and consequences of this revolution?
Were the changes it created "good" or "bad"? Before addressing these
fascinating questions, it is necessary to gain a clear picture of the
changes themselves.
A. Recent Limitations on Landlord's Common Law Right to
Offer Substandard Units (The "Implied Warranty" of
Habitability)
Although the misnamed implied warranty of habitability has been
comprehensively discussed elsewhere, 7 a brief summary of the doctrine
will be convenient for the reader. I also will make some distinctions not
fully developed elsewhere in the literature, but which will help in evalu-
ating the doctrine.
Before 1969 the law in most jurisdictions was simple: caveat lessee.
The landlord ordinarily had no duty to repair defects in the premises,
regardless of whether they existed at the time of the lease or arose there-
(1981); see also Radin, Property andPersonhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 994 (1982) (if leasehold is
personal residence, law should grant tenure during good behavior, regardless of lease term).
5 Cunningham, The New ImpliedandStatutoy Warranties ofHabitability in Residential Leases:
From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1979). Similarly, Professor Glendon concludes that
there has been a "publicization" of residential landlord-tenant law in which the legal relation
of landlord to tenant depends on an imposed status, rather than on private agreement. Glen-
don, supra note 1, at 575-76.
6 Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U.L.
REv. 1 (1976).
7 See, e.g., articles cited supra notes 1-6.
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after. Today, at least forty jurisdictions follow the opposite rule.8 Land-
lords in these jurisdictions have a duty to repair all defects, regardless of
when they arise. At a minimum a "defect" includes any condition that
substantially violates the applicable housing code. This duty is usually
thought to rest on an "implied warranty" made by the landlord to the
tenant that the premises are fit and will be maintained for their in-
tended use as a residence. Under prior law the landlord was not re-
quired to repair defects unless he had expressly agreed to do so.9 The
current law of many jurisdictions ordinarily requires the landlord to re-
pair all defects, even if the tenant has agreed to do so.10
Although there were precursors, 1 Javins v. First National Realty
Corp. 12 is the leading case establishing the implied warranty of habita-
bility. In this 1970 case, a District of Columbia landlord attempted to
evict several tenants for nonpayment of rent. The tenants defended on
the ground that their apartment house contained over 1,500 housing
code violations. Although the lower courts held this fact to be irrele-
vant, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upheld the defense in a widely cited and influential opinion by Judge J.
Skelly Wright.
The principal substantive issue inJavins concerned whether the les-
sor of an urban multiple dwelling unit owed a duty to the tenant to keep
the unit and the apartment house free of substantial housing code viola-
8 Note, Recovery Under the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 10 FORDHAM L. REv. 285, 292
(1982); Note, Knight v. Hallsthammar: The Implied Warranty of Habitability Revisited, 15 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 353, 354 n.4 (1982) (citing and summarizing cases and statutes).
9 See generally R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 3:13
(1980).
10 See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT AcT, 7A U.L.A. 499 (1978) (last
amended 1974) [hereinafter cited as URLTA]. As of February 1982, 13 jurisdictions had
adopted URLTA: Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, and Virginia. The Act has influenced legislation in
many additional states. URLTA § 2.104(c), (d), 7A U.L.A. 529-30 (1978), provides that al-
though landlord and tenant may agree that the tenant will perform certain repairs and main-
tenance, the agreement is enforceable only if it is "entered into in good faith and not for the
purpose of evading the obligations of the landlord." Certain other safeguards are also enunci-
ated, and thus many actual agreements will not be enforceable. See also RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF PROPERTY § 5.6 (1977) (enforcing agreements reducing landlord's obligations
"unless they are unenforceable in whole or in part because they are unconscionable or signifi-
cantly against public policy").
In Knight v. Hallsthammar, 29 Cal. 3d 46, 54, 623 P.2d 268, 273, 171 Cal. Rptr. 707, 712
(1981), the court held that "a tenant's lack of knowledge of defects is not a prerequisite to the
landlord's breach of the warranty." In Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973),
the court refused to enforce an explicit waiver of the warranty of habitability given in consid-
eration of a rent reduction. See generaly Dutenhaver, Non- Waiver of the Implied Warranty of
Habitability in Residential Leases, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 60 (1978) (benefit of implied war-
ranty of habitability for tenants who need protections "far outweighs the interest of law in
contractual freedom").
11 See, e.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Marini v. Ireland, 56
N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
12 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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tions. The court held that such a duty did exist. Although there were
several misleading references to an implied warranty of habitability, 13 a
careful 'eading of the case shows that these references were more rele-
vant to the question of remedy than to the substantive issue of the exis-
tence of the duty. On the substantive issue Judge Wright clearly held
that the source of the duty was the housing code itself, not any agree-
ment of the parties. Thus the parties could not waive or disclaim the so-
called implied warranty, regardless of how explicit the attempted waiver
was or of how knowledgeable and powerful the tenant was. As Judge
Wright stated, the duty was one "implied . . .by operation of law,"14
regardless of whether the landlord in fact implied it or the tenant under-
stood the landlord to have implied it and regardless of whether the lease
purported to waive the warranty.' 5 The tenants in Javins were on
month-to-month written leases.' 6 If the duty rested on a contract im-
plied in fact, a court could plausibly have considered tenants who re-
mained for more than one month after discovering the defects to have
waived their objections.' 7 Because theJavins court did not even discuss
waiver, the duty it imposed on the landlord must have been based on
violations of the housing code, and not on an "implied warranty" made
by the landlord. The distinction is important because, as discussed be-
low, the remedies appropriate for breach of a contractual duty are inap-
propriate for breach of a duty based on a code or statute. 18
13 Id at 1077, 1080.
14 Id at 1081 n.56.
15 Id at 1082 n.58. Judge Wright's statement that a waiver of the warranty would be
unenforceable was dictum, because no such waiver was attempted inJavins. The dictum,
however, could not be, and was not, ignored in subsequent cases.
16 Although Judge Wright's opinion notes that written leases were involved, id at 1077
n.29, it does not indicate that the leases created only month-to-month tenancies. Nevertheless,
the tenancies were month-to-month. Brief for the Washington Planning and Housing Associ-
ation as Amicus Curiae at 2, Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). The opinion is confusing because it is based on a warranty im-
plied in law, yet also refers to the supposed justified expectations of the parties or of typical
hypothetical parties to support its result. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1081 n.56.
Although theJavins opinion does not explicitly state that the tenancies were for a fixed
term (which they clearly were not) the opinion seems to so imply:
Since a lease contract specifts a particular period of time during which the
tenant has a right to use his apartment for shelter, he may legitimately expect
that the apartment will be fit for habitation for the time period for which it is
rented. We point out that in the present cases there is no allegation that
appellants' apartments were in poor condition or in violation of the housing
code at the commencement of the leases. Since the lessees continue to pay the
same rent, they were entitled to expect that the landlord would continue to
keep the premises in their beginning condition during the lease ten. It is pre-
cisely such expectations that the law now recognizes as deserving of formal,
legal protection.
Id at 1079 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
17 On the other hand, it could be argued that a month-to-month tenant does not waive
the right to object to newly arising defects merely by remaining a tenant. The expenditure in
time, effort, and money involved in moving may render the decision to stay involuntary.
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The traditional rule in landlord-tenant law was that the tenant's
contractual duty ("covenant") to pay rent was independent of the land-
lord's covenant to maintain the premises in good repair. If this rule
were applied to theJavins case, the tenants would lose and be evicted
because the landlord's breach of its statutory duty would not justify the
tenants' refusal to pay rent. Judge Wright held that the independent
covenant rule was inappropriate in the modern residential leasing con-
text. Instead, the contract principle of dependent covenants should ap-
ply,19 under which a breach of a substantial covenant by one party
justifies nonperformance of a covenant by the other party.
Applying the contract doctrine of dependent covenants to the lease
transaction inJavizs was a big step; extending it to a statutory, as op-
posed to a contractual, duty was a relatively minor one. Unfortunately,
the court's extended discussion justifying the application of general con-
tract principles to leases 20 obscured the central fact that the court based
the landlord's duty on the housing code, not on any warranty implied in
fact. Consequently, when subsequent courts attempted to measure the
aggrieved tenant's damages, they applied contract principles to a duty
not based on contract. The result was confusion. Courts attempted to
award tenants the difference, measured in dollars, between what was
"promised" and what was delivered 2 '-ignoring that in most cases in-
volving slum property the landlord delivered exactly what was prom-
ised, a unit that did not conform to the housing code. Thus, if courts
applied this approach literally, tenants would be entitled to no damages.
In recoiling from this undesired result, courts created further inconsis-
tencies. They assumed a fictitious promise by the landlord to provide a
code conforming unit and then awarded the tenant the difference be-
tween the value of what was fictitiously promised and what was actually
18 See infia notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
19 Javins, 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). The common
law had previously developed the doctrine of constructive eviction, a somewhat rudimentary
form of the dependent covenant principle. See Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826),
the leading constructive eviction case. Under the constructive eviction doctrine, however, the
aggrieved tenant could not remain on the premises. Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal Real
Estate Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 77, 256 N.E.2d 707, 308 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1970). The most significant
contribution ofJavins was its holding that an aggrieved tenant could remain on the premises
and still be wholly or partially excused from the duty to pay rent when a landlord wholly or
partially breached its duties.
20 Although there was ample discussion inJavins of the advisability of applying general
contract principles to leases, 428 F.2d at 1074-80, there was almost no discussion of the advisa-
bility of applying the particular contract principle of dependent covenants to leases, id at
1082.
21 See, e.g., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 638, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 719 (1974); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Boston Hous. Auth. v.
Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 203, 293 N.E.2d 831, 845 (1973); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Jones,
108 N.J. Super. 395, 403, 261 A.2d 413, 417 (Law Div. 1970).
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promised and delivered-a substandard apartment.2 2 This approach, if
followed to its logical conclusion, could result in the absurdity of forcing
a landlord to pay a tenant for living in a nonconforming apartment
that, in fact, fulfilled the expectations of both parties.23 At least one case
approached such a result by allowing a tenant to live rent free in a living
unit that may have met the tenant's original expectations. 24
More recently, several courts have avoided these difficulties by
adopting a "percentage reduction in use" method of damage measure-
ment.2 5 This method reduces the contract rent owed by the percentage
that the code violations diminished the use and enjoyment of the apart-
ment. Whatever its practical or theoretical defects, this method has the
virtue of implicitly abandoning the fiction that the contract measure of
damages is workable or appropriate when no breach of a contractually
based duty has occurred.
Javins involved a landlord's breach of a code imposed duty. If one
labels this an "implied warranty" case it is easily confused with a true
implied warranty case such as Lemle v. Breeden. 26 In Lemle, the plaintiff
rented a luxury vacation home. Shortly after moving in, the tenant dis-
covered that the home was infested with rats. When attempts at rat
control failed, the plaintiff promptly moved out and sued for a return of
his rent deposit. The Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the tenant's
obligation to pay rent was dependent on the landlord's performance of
her implied warranty of habitability. Because the landlord had
breached the implied warranty, the tenant was excused from performing
his dependent covenant to pay rent. In Lemle the covenant was real
although unexpressed, and the duty breached was truly a contractual
one for which a contractual measure of damages was appropriate.
22 See cases cited supra note 21.
23 Suppose a landlord leases a substandard apartment for $200 per month with the ex-
press understanding that he will not make any repairs. Suppose also that if all code violations
were cured the property would cost the tenant $500 per month. Thus, the difference between
the value of the landlord's fictitious promise to provide a code conforming apartment and
what he actually promised and delivered is $300. If the tenant pays no rent and the landlord
sues to evict the tenant, the tenant can use the fictitious promise theory to counterclaim for
$300 in damages compared to the landlord's rent claim against the tenant for $200. A court
that applied the tenant's theory would require the landlord to pay the tenant $100. This
amount would be awarded despite the tenant's month-long, rent-free occupancy of an apart-
ment that fulfilled his expectations. In effect, the fictitious promise theory awards the tenant
a double recovery: a reduced initial rent and damages for code violations.
24 Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Although the
court referred to an "apparent understanding" that the landlord would repair, id at 858, it
seems that the written lease made no reference to such a promise. See Diamond Hous. Corp.
v. Robinson, 257 A.2d 492 (D.C. 1969) (discussing lease but not mentioning any agreement to
repair).
25 E.g., McKenna v. Begin, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 304, 362 N.E.2d 548 (1977); Academy
Spires, Inc. v. Brown, IIl N.J. Super. 477, 487-88, 268 A.2d 556, 562 (Essex County Ct.
1970).
26 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
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Both Lemle andJavins created significant new substantive and pro-
cedural law. Substantively, Lemle recognized that landlord covenants
could be implied in fact and that such implied in fact warranties should
be enforced. Javins recognized that duties imposed by a housing code
could be enforced by the tenant. One difference between the two cases
is that a Lemle-type covenant implied in fact, can be waived or negated
by the tenant; a statutory duty such as that found injavins cannot.
On the remedial level, bothJavins and Lemle broke new ground in
holding that a tenant's duty to pay rent is dependent on a landlord's
substantial performance of its obligations. The two cases differ, how-
ever, in that a contractual measure of damages, although appropriate in
Lemle, was inappropriate inJavins where the breach was of a statutory
duty.
Other cases and statutes have expanded the principles established
by Lemle andJavins. Some jurisdictions permit a tenant, subject to cer-
tain limitations, to repair a defective condition and deduct the cost of
the repair from the rent tendered to the landlord. 27 Other jurisdictions
permit the premises to be placed in receivership when the landlord has
substantially breached his statutory duties. 28
When a tenant lawfully withholds rent in response to a landlord's
breach, the tenant exercises a form of self-help. The tenant judges the
landlord's conduct and imposes a sanction, without a judicial proceed-
ing or other semblance of due process. 29 Frequently, the tenant can re-
main in the apartment without paying rent pending the landlord's
eviction proceedings. In the District of Columbia, however, it is custom-
ary for the landlord to be awarded a "protective order" requiring the
tenant to pay rent into court until the matter is judicially resolved.30
In such influential states as New York and California, courts have
recently held landlords in breach of their duty to maintain the premises
in code-conforming condition even where the defect arose through no
fault of the landlord. For example, in Park West Management Corp. v.
Mitche/l 3I a New York case, the court held that the landlord breached a
duty to maintain the property in a clean and habitable condition when
a strike by the landlord's employees resulted in the closing of the build-
ings' incinerators, forcing tenants to deposit refuse on nearby sidewalks.
The city garbage collectors refused to cross the picket line to collect the
garbage, creating an unhealthy and unpleasant condition. In a Califor-
nia case, Knight v. Hallsthammar,32 a landlord sued to evict tenants who
27 See, e.g., Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
28 See generaly R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 9, § 3:44.
29 As indicated, zn/fa notes 100-06 and accompanying text, courts have abolished most
landlord self-help remedies but have approved tenant self-help remedies.
30 See Mahdi v. Poretsky Management, Inc., 433 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 1981).
31 47 N.Y.2d 316, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1979).
32 29 Cal. 3d 46, 623 P.2d 268, 171 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1981).
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were not paying their rent. The tenants defended on the ground that
the landlord had not made needed repairs. The trial court ruled that
the tenants' defense could succeed only if the landlord had failed to
make repairs after being given a reasonable time to do so. The Supreme
Court of California reversed the trial court and held that rent abate-
ment would be appropriate whenever there was a defect not attributa-
ble to the tenant, regardless of the landlord's lack of fault.33
In summary, more than forty jurisdictions now impose a duty on
the residential landlord to maintain the premises in a habitable code-
conforming condition. This represents a dramatic and significant break
with the law as it existed before 1968.
B. Recent Limitations on Landlord's Common Law Right to Set
the Offering Price of a Rental Unit (Rent Control)
Rent control, now in use in over 200 cities (including such major
cities as Boston, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, and Washing-
ton, D.C.), 4 affects a substantial percentage of the nation's multifamily
rental housing stock.3 5 The overwhelming majority of the rent control
statutes were passed in the 1970s.36
The abandonment by courts of the legal requirement of a housing
''emergency" to validate a rent control ordinance opened the door for
the increased use of rent control ordinances in the seventies.3 7 The
United States Supreme Court's last statement on rent control was in
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,38 decided in 1948. In that case, and in
those preceding it,3 9 the Court stressed the need for an "emergency"
housing situation to sustain a rent control ordinance. In 1969, however,
Judge Friendly stated, in dicta, that a housing shortage creating an
"emergency" was not necessary to justify a rent control ordinance.40 As
a doctrinal matter Judge Friendly was clearly correct; the emergency
33 See also Berman & Sons v. Jefferson, 379 Mass. 196, 198, 396 N.E.2d 981, 983 (1979)
(if dwelling not habitable, "landlord's lack of fault and reasonable efforts to repair do not
prolong [tenant's] duty to pay rent").
34 See NATIONAL MULTI HOUSING COUNCIL, THE SPREAD OF RENT CONTROL, RENT
CONTROL ACTIVITIES THROUGH MAY 31, 1982 (1982) (listing status of rent control in cities
throughout United States).
35 U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON HOUSING 91 (1982) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
36 For useful histories of modem rent control legislation, see generaly M. LETT, RENT
CONTROL: CONCEPTS, REALITIES AND MECHANISMS ch. 1 (1976); R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra
note 9, ch. 7.
37 See Baar & Keating, The Last Stand of Economic Substantive Due Process-The Housing
Emergenqy Requirement for Rent Control, 7 URB. LAW. 447 (1975).
38 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
39 See, e.g., Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 245 (1922) (upholding New York
rent control laws because of reports indicating that insufficient housing supply caused "social
emergency" in certain cities).
40 Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
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requirement was no longer consonant with the law as it had developed
in other areas. As he noted: "The time when extraordinarily exigent
circumstances were required to justify price control outside the tradi-
tional public utility areas passed on the day that Nebbia v. New York,
. . . (1934), was decided."'4 1
State courts similarly adopted the Second Circuit's view that an
"emergency" housing shortage was not a legal prerequisite of rent con-
trol.42 In Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 43 the California Supreme Court
rejected the requirement of an emergency, holding that the constitution-
ality of rent controls depends only upon the "existence of a housing
shortage and its concomitant ill effects of sufficient seriousness to make
rent control a rational curative measure." 44 Although courts give great
weight to the legislative determination that a housing shortage exists,
this determination is not formally controlling. As the Birkenfdd court
noted:
[O]ur task is to review the findings. . and to sustain the propriety of
rent controls under the police power unless the findings establish a
complete absence of even a debatable rational basis for the legislative
determination by the Berkeley electorate that rent control is a reason-
able means of counteracting harms and dangers to the public health
and welfare emanating from a housing shortage.45
The above quotation suggests that the presumption of a shortage
justifying rent control is well-nigh conclusive. It does not follow, how-
ever, that courts will uphold every rent control ordinance that legislators
pass in response to a shortage. In Birkenfeld, for example, the court
struck down the ordinance because it "drastically and unnecessarily re-
stricts the rent control board's power to adjust rents, thereby making
inevitable the arbitrary imposition of unreasonably low rent ceilings. '46
An ordinance is valid "only if it is capable of providing adjustments in
maximum rents without a substantially greater incidence and degree of
delay than is practically necessary. '47
Although constitutional restrictions on rent control ordinances ex-
ist, courts have upheld some surprisingly harsh ones. For example, the
New Jersey Supreme Court, which has been very influential in this field,
has rejected the contention that an ordinance is invalid on its face be-
41 Id
42 See Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465
(1976); see also Westchester West No. 2 Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery Co., 276 Md. 448,
463, 348 A.2d 856, 865 (Md. App. 1975); Hutton Park Garden v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543,
350 A.2d 1 (1975).
43 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976).
44 Id at 160, 550 P.2d at 1024, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
45 Id at 161, 550 P.2d at 1024, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
46 Id at 169, 550 P.2d at 1029, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
47 Id, 550 P.2d at 1030, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 494.
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cause it limits annual rent increases to a fixed percentage of existing
rents, or to a percentage of the annual increase in the cost of living.48
Similarly, the court has upheld ordinances that do not necessarily pass
on increases in operating costs to the tenants. "The fact that costs are
increasing faster than permissible rents under a particular ordinance,
. . .or even that some owners are sustaining operating losses will notper
se suffice to prove unconstitutional confiscation. '49
To summarize, the courts' abandonment of the "emergency" re-
quirement has increased the incidence of rent control ordinances. Al-
though there are some limits on the scope of ordinances that will be
upheld, the general judicial trend has been to uphold ordinances that
impose fairly harsh restrictions on landlords.
C. Recent Expansion of Landlord's Tort Liability
1. In General
Under the common law the landlord was generally not liable for
personal or physical injuries caused by defects in the leased premises.50
In 1965 the Restatement (Second) of Torts accepted this position and it
remained the majority rule through the early 1970s. 51 Since then, how-
ever, most courts that have ruled on the question have rejected the tort
immunity of landlords and have imposed a duty of reasonable care.52
In overruling prior controlling cases, the courts have dramatically in-
creased the landlord's potential liabilities.
In the leading case, Sargent v. Ross,55 the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire stated:
[We today discard the rule of "caveat lessee" and the doctrine of
landlord nonliability in tort to which it gave birth. . . .Henceforth,
landlords as other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject
others to an unreasonable risk of harm. . . .A landlord must act as a
reasonable person under all of the circumstances. ... 54
In addition, since the landmark case of Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts
Avenue Apartment Corp.,55 landlords have also been held liable for the
rapes, burglaries, and assaults committed by criminal intruders, when
tenants can show that the landlord did not take due care to protect
48 Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 571, 350 A.2d 1, 16 (1975);
Brunetti v. New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 592, 350 A.2d 19, 27 (1975).
49 Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 NJ. 543, 569-71, 350 A.2d 1, 16 (1975).
50 For an exhaustive treatment, see Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat
Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975 WIs. L. REV. 19, 48-49.
51 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §§ 377-379A (1965).
52 See generally 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 234[2] (1982).
53 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
54 113 N.H. at 397, 308 A.2d at 534.
55 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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against such occurrences. 56 Generally, landlord tort liability has rested
on negligence, but there is recent support in some lower courts for im-
posing strict liability on landlords for personal injury or physical
damage. 57
Thus, in a single decade, landlords have lost the tort immunity that
had been recognized for centuries, and have even become responsible for
the criminal acts of others that they could have prevented with reason-
able care. Rarely in the history of American property law has there
been such a sudden judicial rejection of well established precedent.
2. Lease Clause Purporting to Exculpate Landlord for Its Negligent
Conduct Generally Held Void
A typical exculpatory clause in a lease purports to relieve the lessor
from liability to the lessee for personal injuries or property damage
caused by the negligence of the lessor. In 1959, the Illinois Supreme
Court, in upholding such a clause, found only one case in a court of last
resort "that has held such clauses invalid in the absence of a statute so
requiring,"5 8 but cited numerous cases that had upheld such clauses. By
1971 the majority rule continued to be that such clauses were ordinarily
valid, but there was substantial precedent to the contrary. 59 By 1976
some twenty-one jurisdictions (compared with the two or three jurisdic-
tions that had such statutes in 1960) had statutorily invalidated such
exculpatory clauses.60 Section 1.403(a)(4) of the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act (URLTA), adopted in thirteen states, as well
as statutes in California, New York, and other jurisdictions took the
same position. 6 1 Significantly, many cases decided since 1970 have re-
fused to enforce such clauses, even in the absence of a controlling
statute.
62
56 See, e.g., Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr.
494 (1981) (tenant raped, assaulted, and robbed in apartment lobby stated good cause of
action against landlord); Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980) (landlord
liable to "mugged" tenant for breach of implied undertaking to provide adequate security).
For useful discussions, see R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 9, ch. 4; Browder, The Taming of a
Duy-The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REV. 99 (1982); Selvin, Landlord Tort Liability
for Criminal Attacks on Tenants. Developments Since Kline, 9 REAL EST. L.J. 311 (1981).
57 See, e.g., McGuiness v. Jakubiak, 106 Misc. 2d 317, 431 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1980)
(leakage); McBride v. 218 E. 70th Assocs., 102 Misc. 2d 279, 425 N.Y.S.2d 910 (App. Term
1979) (flood damage); Kaplan v. Coulston, 85 Misc. 2d 745, 381 N.Y.S. 634 (Civ. Ct. 1976)
(kitchen cabinet fell and injured tenant); ef Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101
Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972) (strict liability applicable to commercial lessors of personal property).
58 O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 Ill. 2d 436, 439, 155 N.E.2d 545,
546 (1959).
59 See Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 321 (1973).
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.3 statutory note (1977); see also Cap-
paert v. Junker, 413 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1982).
61 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1953 (West Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 80, § 91 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1982); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-321 (McKinney 1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 235-c (McKinney Supp. 1982).
62 See, e.g., Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 512, 573 P.2d 465, 143 Cal.
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D. Recent Limitations on Landlord's Common Law Right to
Choose or Reject New Tenants
1. Antidiscrimination Laws
Under the common law, a landlord could arbitrarily select or reject
prospective new tenants. 63 Before 1968, only a few states barred dis-
crimination on the grounds of race, creed, or national origin. No state
barred discrimination on any other ground. The New York case of Kra-
marsky v. Stahl Management Co. 64 illustrates the common law position. In
Kramarsky, a landlord refused to rent to a lawyer because the lawyer
might prove to be a troublesome tenant, too knowledgeable of her legal
rights and too willing to enforce them. The court upheld the landlord
on the ground that he had a common law right to refuse to accept a
tenant for any reason except insofar as this rule was changed by
statute.65
In 1968, Congress passed the federal Fair Housing Act. 66 This stat-
ute prohibited discrimination in rentals (with certain minor exceptions)
on the grounds of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' ' 67 Al-
though a landlord's decision to exclude lawyers, as in the Kramarsky case,
would not be affected by the federal Fair Housing Act, such a decision
would definitely be barred in California. In Marina Point v. Wolson, 68 the
Rptr. 247 (1978); Cardona v. Eden Realty Co., 118 N.J. Super. 381, 288 A.2d 34 (App. Div.
1972); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 5.6, 17.6 (1977) (supporting invali-
dation of such clauses even in absence of statute); cf. Taylor v. Leedy & Co., 412 So. 2d 763
(Ala. 1982) (clause does not relieve from liability landlord who may have deliberately con-
cealed known defect); Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d
812 (1974) (applying Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Act to rentals of residences).
63 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541, 90 N.Y.S. 2d 201
(1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 153 (1950).
64 92 Misc. 2d 1030, 401 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
65 Absent a supervening statutory proscription, a landlord is free to do what he
wishes with his property, and to rent or not to rent to any given person at his
whim. The only restraints [sic] which the law has imposed upon free exercise
of his discretion is that he may not use race, creed, color, national origin, sex
or marital status as criteria. So, regrettable though it may be, a landlord can
employ other criteria to determine the acceptability of his tenants-occupa-
tional, physical or otherwise. He may decide not to rent to singers because
they are too noisy, or not to rent to bald-headed men because he has been told
they give wild parties. He can bar his premises to the lowest strata of society,
should he choose, or to the highest, if that be his personal desire.
Id. at 1032, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 945. Note that in New York a landlord cannot refuse to rent to
an unmarried couple. See Yorkshire House Assocs. v. Lulkin, 114 Misc. 2d 40, 450 N.Y.S.2d
962 (Civ. Ct. 1982); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(5)(a)(1) (McKinney 1982).
66 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
67 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976). The prohibition against discrimination on grounds of sex
was added in 1974 by Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 527(b)2, 88 Stat. 633, 729.
68 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982).
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landlord discriminated against children-refusing to rent to families
with children and insisting that tenants with children move at the end
of their lease. The California Supreme Court found the policy irrational
and prevented the landlord from enforcing it. The court's decision was
based on an antidiscrimination statute, the Unruh Act,69 that appeared,
prima facie, only to bar discrimination on the usual grounds of race,
creed, sex, and national origin. Although Marina involved a landlord's
refusal to renew a lease, it also applies to an initial refusal to rent. The
court indicated that it would reject a landlord's policy barring any large
class of people, such as lawyers, from becoming tenants. "Whether the
exclusionary policy rests on the alleged undesirable propensities of those
of a particular race, nationality, occupation, political affiliation, or age,
in this context the Unruh Act protects individuals from such arbitrary
discrimination. '70 The court noted that previous opinions of the Attor-
ney General had interpreted the Unruh Act to prohibit discrimination
because of student enrollment, receipt of welfare benefits, occupation, or
marital status.7I The court also indicated that excluding, for example,
"homosexuals, or alternatively . . . nonhomosexuals" from an apart-
ment complex would be barred by the Unruh Act. 72 It thus appears
that in California a landlord may only refuse to rent to a prospective
tenant for good cause. Instead of merely being liable if his actions are
based on prohibited motives, the landlord shoulders the burden of dem-
onstrating good cause.
Thus, in the last fifteen years the law has changed from permitting
discrimination in almost every state on almost any ground to prohibit-
ing discrimination in all states on grounds of race, creed, sex, or national
origin, and, in California, on any ground the court deems arbitrary.
2. Asszgnment and Sublease
At common law, if the lease provided that there could be no assign-
ment or sublease by the lessee without the landlord's consent, the land-
lord had the right to withhold consent arbitrarily. 73 In the early
seventies, however, courts began to restrict the landlord's right to act
arbitrarily, and several courts held that the landlord may withhold con-
sent only if he acts reasonably. 74 The Restatement (Second) of Property
69 CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 1982); see also CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12955, 12980-12988
(West 1980) (Fair Housing Act and Enforcement Procedures).
70 Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 726, 640 P.2d 115, 117, 180 Cal. Rptr.
496, 499 (1982).
71 Id at 736, 640 P.2d at 124, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
72 Id at 741 n.9, 640 P.2d at 127 n.9, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 508 n.9; see also Hubert v.
Williams, 133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Super. Ct. 1982) (homosexuals pro-
tected by Unruh Civil Rights Act).
73 Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Hotel Martinique Assocs., 12 N.Y.2d 339, 190 N.E.2d 660,
239 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1963).
74 See, e.g., Homa-Goff Interiors Inc. v. Cauder, 350 So. 2d 1035 (Ala. 1977); Shakes
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takes the position that, absent a freely negotiated provision granting the
landlord the right to withhold consent, the landlord must act reason-
ably.75 Several states, including Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, and New
York have enacted statutes imposing a reasonableness requirement. 76
Although URLTA does not expressly address this question, it is
possible that section 1.302, which imposes a duty of good faith for the
exercise of rights "under this Act" may be construed to impose a good
faith requirement on the landlord's exercise of a right to withhold con-
sent to a proposed assignment or sublease of a residential lease. One can
argue, however, that the landlord's common law right to withhold con-
sent to an assignment when the lease purports to give that right is not
the exercise of a right "under this Act" and, therefore, the good faith
requirement does not apply. In contrast, the Model Residential Land-
lord-Tenant Code, which served as a source for URLTA, imposed an
express good faith requirement on the landlord in this context. 77
URLTA's failure to adopt the Model Code's assignment provision sug-
gests that the common law freedom to act arbitrarily has not been af-
fected by URLTA.
The landlord's common law right to reject arbitrarily a proposed
assignee or sublessee is related to the landlord's power to act arbitrarily
in selecting or rejecting a new tenant. The proposed assignee or subles-
see may be objectionable to the landlord for reasons that seem arbitrary
but may be important to the landlord. For example, as noted above, the
California Supreme Court has held that the exclusion of children from
an apartment complex is ordinarily "arbitrary" and illegal. Presuma-
bly, the landlord excludes children because it is profitable to do so. The
landlord may decide that he can obtain higher rents at less expense by
excluding children than by permitting them. The same may be true of
morally reprehensible racial or religious discrimination.
E. Recent Limitations on Landlord's Common Law Right to
Evict Tenant at Termination of Lease
1. Retaliatoy Eviction
In the landmark case of Edwards v. Habib, 78 Judge Wright held that
a landlord could not refuse to renew a lease in retaliation for a tenant's
complaint to a housing code authority about code violations. The ten-
ant would be entitled to remain as long as the landlord's motive for
refusing to renew remained retaliatory. In Robinson v. Diamond Housing
Bldg. Co. v. Federal Lime & Stone Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 57 Ohio Op. 2d 486, 277 N.E.2d
584 (1971).
75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 15.2(2) (1977).
76 Id. § 15.2 statutory note 2.
77 MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-403 (Tent. Draft 1969).
78 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
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Corp., 79 Judge Wright extended the doctrine to include a tenant who
was paying no rent under the doctrine of rent abatement for code viola-
tions and who was threatened with eviction because the landlord
wanted to take the code-violating property permanently off the market.
The court required the landlord to correct the violation and to rent the
property to the tenant for an indefinite period, or until he could con-
vince a jury that his motive for nonrenewal was not retaliatory.
Following the Edwards decision, many state decisions and statutes
adopted and significantly expanded the retaliatory eviction doctrine. 80
For example, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that a landlord could not
retaliate against tenants who expressed opposition to the landlord's de-
velopment plans for the premises. 8 1 Other cases have held that statutes
barring retaliatory evictions do not prevent courts from developing ad-
ditional common law protections from other forms of landlord
retaliation.8 2
The California retaliatory eviction statute grants very broad pro-
tection to tenants.83 A landlord who violates the statute is liable for (1)
actual damages, (2) punitive damages of not less than $100 and up to
$1,000 for each retaliatory act, (3) reasonable attorney's fees, and (4)
any other remedies provided by statutory or decisional law. Further-
more, the landlord may not refuse to renew a tenant's lease because the
tenant "has lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under the
law."'8 4 This statute resembles a "just cause" eviction statute, a type of
statute discussed in the next section.
2. Just Cause Eviction Statutes
At common law, a landlord could evict a tenant after the lease ter-
minated for any reason or for no reason. This common law right has
been limited in every state by the federal Fair Housing Act, which pro-
hibits discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, national origin or
sex,85 and in most states by the doctrine prohibiting retaliatory evic-
tion.8 6 Some landlords, however, have experienced even greater restric-
tion of their common law rights. New Jersey, for example, permits the
landlord to evict a tenant at the end of the lease term only for "good
79 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
80 See generall.y R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 9, ch. 12.
81 Windward Partners v. Delos Santos, 59 Hawaii 104, 577 P.2d 326 (1978); see also
Barela v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 3d 244, 636 P.2d 582, 178 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1981) (eviction
after tenant complained to police about child molestation by landlord deemed retaliatory).
82 See, e.g., S.P. Growers Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 552 P.2d 721, 131 Cal. Rptr.
761 (1976).
83 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942.5 (West Supp. 1982).
84 Id § 1942.5(c).
85 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976).
86 See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
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cause."' 7 Under such statutes, a landlord may legally evict the tenant
only for reasons specified in the statute. In effect, the tenant may arbi-
trarily terminate the tenancy at the end of the term, while the landlord
may terminate only for just cause.
Most jurisdictions that have rent control also limit the grounds on
which a landlord may evict.88 In addition, all tenants in housing that is
owned or subsidized by the government are protected by just cause evic-
tion laws.89 Just cause protection even applies to section 890 subsidized
tenants in existing privately owned housing.9 1 Thus, all tenants in New
Jersey, plus tenants in other jurisdictions who (1) are protected by a rent
control ordinance that has a just cause eviction provision, (2) live in
government owned or subsidized housing, or (3) are subsidized tenants
in privately owned housing, cannot be evicted at the end of the lease
term, except for reasons that the statute, ordinance, regulation, or courts
define as "just. '92
3. Ordinances Limiting Landlord's Common Law Right to Convert
Rental Units to Condominiums and to Evict Tenants of the
Fonner Rental Units at the End of the Lease Term
Condominiums9 3 can be created in new unoccupied buildings or in
buildings that are rental properties with existing tenants. The latter sit-
uation concerns us here. When rental properties are converted to condo-
87 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West Supp. 1982).
88 See, e.g., Gruen v. Patterson, 55 N.Y.2d 631, 430 N.E.2d 1306, 446 N.Y.S.2d 253
(1981).
89 See 24 C.F.R. §§ 866.50-.59, 880.607, 881.607 (1982).
90 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (discussed infra note 289).
91 Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 302 (1982); Swann v. Gatonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982); see also Heen,
Due Process Protections-for Tenants in Section 8 Assisted Housing. Prospects for a Good Cause Eviction
Standard, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1 (1978); Klein & Schrider, Procedural Due Process and the
Section 8 Lensed Housing Program, 66 KY. L.J. 303 (1977); cf Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212
(9th Cir. 1982) (private landlord cannot act arbitrarily in selecting § 8 tenants). For leases
entered into since October 1, 198 1, a private landlord must renew a § 8 tenancy unless he has
"good cause" not to. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
§ 326(e)(1), 95 Stat. 357, 407; Sarshik, The Effect ofStatutop' Changes Upon the Rights of Section 8
Tenants, 14 URB. LAw. 749 (1982).
92 A landlord who is subject to a just cause eviction rule probably would be extremely
cautious about whom he permitted to move into the unit because an unsatisfactory tenant
would be difficult to evict. In one disturbing case a landlord was not able to evict a tenant
who was a chronically late payer of rents, because the statute did not specify this as cause for
eviction. See Gruen v. Patterson, 55 N.Y.2d 631, 430 N.E.2d 1306, 446 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1981).
A just cause eviction requirement might also tend to make a particular rental project less
attractive for desirable tenants because it is more difficult for a landlord to remove undesir-
able tenants. See Fuerst & Petty, Pblic Housing in the Courts: Prrhic Victoriesfor the Poor, 9 URB.
LAw. 496 (1977).
93 Condominiums and cooperatives are two forms of ownership of individual units in a
multiple dwelling. Although they have different legal characteristics, for convenience I will
refer to both forms as condominiums.
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miniums the process is cal'led a condominium conversion. Prior to 1970
condominium conversions were rare, but in the past decade they have
increased rapidly. 94
Not surprisingly, legislation regulating condominium conversions
arose when condominium conversions became common in the seventies.
Conversion related regulations can be categorized as follows: those
designed to protect tenants of converted buildings; those intended to
protect buyers of converted units; those developed to preserve the sup-
ply of rental housing; and those aimed at preserving the supply of low-
to moderate-income housing. To date, very few states and localities
have passed the latter two types of legislation.
Just under one-half of the states have legislated protections for
tenants of converted buildings; and about one-half have laws protect-
ing purchasers of both new and converted condominium units. States
which have enacted tenant or buyer protection measures often con-
tain metropolitan areas which are experiencing high levels of
conversion.
At the local level, although just over one-third of all jurisdictions
have had or still have conversion activity, fewer than one in five of
those experiencing conversions has passed a regulatory ordinance.
Larger jurisdictions and those with more conversions are more likely
to adopt such legislation. About 6 percent ofjurisdictions with past or
present conversions have at one time or another adopted temporary
moratoria halting all conversion activity.
Nearly all local regulatory ordinances provide some protections
to tenants in converting buildings. Such ordinances typically require
90 to 180 days notice to tenants of a planned conversion. A few locali-
94 Very few rental properties were converted to multiple ownership in this coun-
try prior to 1970. Since then, 366,000 rental housing units have been con-
verted. Of these, only 18,000 are cooperative conversions. The rate of
conversion has been accelerating: in the period 1977 through 1979, 260,000
units were converted, 71 percent of the decade's total. To date, conversion
activity has been concentrated in larger metropolitan areas: 76 percent of all
conversions have occurred in the 37 largest SMSAs, and 59 percent have
taken place in just 12 of these areas. There is some evidence, however, that
the conversion phenomenon may be expanding to or increasing in smaller
metropolitan areas. Within the largest metropolitan areas of the Nation, a
surprisingly large amount of conversion (49%) has occurred in the suburban
jurisdictions; the remaining 51 percent has taken place within central cities.
By the end of 1979, 1.3 percent of the nation's occupied rental housing stock
had been converted. However, there is considerable variation from one met-
ropolitan area to another, as well as within each area. For example, in the
New York City and Los Angeles areas, 1 percent of all rental units were con-
verted during the 1970s, compared to 6 percent or more in the Chicago, Den-
ver, and Washington, D.C. areas. There are some atypical communities and
smaller cities where as much as 20 to 30 percent of the rental stock has been
converted, and a few sections of cities where more than 30 percent of the
rental stock has been converted.
U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, Div. OF
POLICY STUDIES, THE CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING TO CONDOMINIUMS AND COOP-
ERATIVES i-iii (1980) [hereinafter cited as CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING].
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ties offer special protections to elderly and handicapped tenants, such
as the right to extend their lease period.95
Although this suggests that local regulatory ordinances "typically"
offer only moderate restrictions on a landlord's ability to convert rental
property to condominiums, some localities have temporarily, or even
permanently, barred conversions. 96 Other local ordinances have
achieved substantially the same effect by prohibiting the eviction of ten-
ants to effectuate a conversion, even at the termination of the lease.
In Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 97 for example, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts upheld an ordinance that prohibited the pur-
chaser of a condominium from using it for his own personal residence, as
long as the previous tenant (whose lease had expired) desired to remain
there. The court held that as long as the tenant paid a "reasonable rent"
as required by the condominium conversion ordinance, the owner of the
unit could be barred from using his own property as his residence, even
after the termination of the lease in accordance with its terms.
In another recent Massachusetts case, CHR General, Inc. v. City of
Newton, 98 the plaintiff challenged a city ordinance requiring landlords to
wait between two and five years from the issuance of a permit allowing a
condominium conversion before a landlord could remove a tenant
whose lease had expired. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
struck down the ordinance because it exceeded home rule authority.
The court did not suggest, however, that the ordinance was unconstitu-
tional because it deprived landlords of property without due process or
just compensation.
The ordinances involved in the Flynn and CHR cases represent a
significant expansion of tenants' rights and a corresponding contraction
of landlords' rights. There are similar condominium conversion ordi-
nances in a number of other jurisdictions.99
F. Limitations on Landlord's Common Law Remedies Following
Tenant's Breach
1. Self-Help Remedies to Obtain Possession
The Restatement (Second) of Property takes the position that the
availability of a summary proceeding for evicting a wrongfully occupy-
ing tenant bars the use of self-help by the landlord "unless the control-
95 CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING, supra note 94, at viii-ix.
96 See generaly Snyderman & Morrison, Rental Market Protection Through the Conversion Mor-
atorium: Legal Limits and Alternatives, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 973 (1980).
97 Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 692, 418 N.E.2d 335.
98 1982 Mass. Adv. Sh. 351, 439 N.E.2d 788.
99 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-61.1, -61.11; -61.22 to .39 (West Supp. 1982). See
generally Day & Fogel, The Condominium Crisis: .4 Problem Unresolved, 1981 URB. LAW ANN. 3,
44-54 (describing some of more stringent types of conversion controls).
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ling law preserves the right of self-help."' 0 ° In his authoritative work,
Professor Schoshinski concludes: "Most courts that have recently reex-
amined the common law have responded. . . by drastically limiting the
degree of self-help permitted or abolishing the remedy altogether. No
doubt the trend of modern decisions and recent legislation is to make
resort to the legal process the landlord's exclusive remedy." 0 1
Landlord self-help includes tenant lockouts and utility, water, or
other service cut-offs. In many jurisdictions, the landlord will be liable
for punitive damages if he uses such tactics.102
2. Landlord's Right of Distress (Distraint)
At common law the landlord had a right of distress. Under this
right the landlord could seize the tenant's property located on the
rented premises and hold it until the rent was paid.10 3 As early as 1952,
distraint had been abolished in some states and modified in most
others.104 Since then the trend has been to limit further or abolish that
right. URLTA, for example, abolished the common law right of dis-
traint for rent. 10 5 Many courts have held the statutory remedy of dis-
traint unconstitutional because it denies the tenant of his property
without due process. 106 It may be that some of these cases should be
reconsidered in the light of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 107 which held
that the enforcement of a warehouse lien by private sale is not state
action subject to constitutional restraint. Nonetheless, it is fair to say
that of the minority of states that recognized distraint against residential
tenants in 1952, many have abandoned the remedy either by statute or
judicial decision.
100 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 14.2 (1977).
101 R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 9, § 6:9, at 408.
102 See, e.g., Kinney v. Vaccari, 27 Cal. 3d 348, 612 P.2d 877, 165 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1980)
(applying CAL. CIV. CODE § 789.3 (West 1982)); see also URLTA § 4.107, 7A U.L.A. 546
(1978) (authorizing award of treble damages or three months rent, whichever is larger).
103 Ste AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.72, at 332 (Casner ed. 1952).
104 Id
105 URLTA § 4.205(b), 7A U.L.A. 552 (1978).
106 See Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W. Va. 1972); Musselman v. Spies,
343 F. Supp. 528 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Hold v. Brown, 336 F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Brooks v.
LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 11 Ill. App. 3d 791, 298 N.E.2d 262 (1973); Stateexrel Payne v. Walden,
156 W. Va. 60, 190 S.E.2d 770 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 statu-
tory note 5 (1977) (citing Stroemer v. Shevin, 399 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Fla. 1973)); see alro R.
SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 9, § 6:25, at 448 n.56 (citing cases invalidating distress statutes:
Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Phillips v. Guin & Hunt, Inc., 344 So.
2d 568 (Fla. 1977); Vann Ness Indus. v. Claremont Painting & Decorating Co., 129 N.J.
Super. 507, 342 A.2d 102 (Ch. Div. 1974); Stevenson v. Cullen Center, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 731
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975)).
107 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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3. Landlord's Duty to Mitigate Damages Upon Tenant-s Breach
According to the majority common law position, the landlord had
no duty to mitigate damages upon the tenant's wrongful abandonment
of the premises.10  URLTA rejects that view, providing that if the land-
lord does not make a reasonable attempt to mitigate the damages
caused by the tenant's breach, the lease is terminated "as of the date the
landlord has notice of the abandonment."' 10 9 Apparently, a landlord
who does not attempt to mitigate loses his right to damages, even if
damages would have occurred despite reasonable efforts to mitigate.
Other state statutes have also rejected the traditional view.1 10
Recent judicial decisions have tended to reject the common law
rule on mitigation. 1 ' Surprisingly, the Restatement (Second) of Prop-
erty follows the traditional rule of no duty to mitigate, but its position
has influenced few cases.112
G. Miscellaneous Increased Landlord Duties and Tenant
Protections
1. Securip Deposits"13
Because landlord self-help remedies have fallen into disfavor, land-
lords now rely on security deposits as the most expeditious way to pro-
tect themselves against tenant defaults without incurring the expense of
litigation.' 14 At common law there was no ceiling on the size of the ten-
ant's security deposit. Moreover, under the majority rule, the landlord
was not obliged to pay interest on the deposit or to avoid commingling
the deposit with his own funds. Thus, the tenants' security deposits pro-
vided the landlord with an additional source of income in the form of an
interest free loan. If the landlord improperly refused to repay a security
deposit, the tenant could sue for its recovery, but normally the tenant
could not recover punitive damages or attorney's fees.
108 See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 9, § 10:12.
109 URLTA § 4.203, 7A U.L.A. 550 (1978).
110 CAL. CiV. CODE § 1951.2 (West Supp. 1982); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-207
(1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.29 (West 1981).
111 Willis v. Soda Shoppes, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 3d 899, 184 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1982); see also
Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977); R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 9, at 677
n.99.
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1(3) (1977). No cases are cited in the
latest (1982-83) Pocket Supplement as following the Restatement Second position. The only case
cited is Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977), which explicitly rejected the
Restatement Second's position as it appeared in an earlier draft. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY § 11.1(3) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1975).
113 A useful article generally covering the field is Yee, Tenant Protection Through Security
Deposit Legislation, 8 REAL EST. LJ. 136 (1979). See also 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
231[2] (1982); R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 9, § 6:27-:44; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY § 12.1 comment 1 (1977).
114 See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 9, § 6:27.
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During the 1970s, these rules were substantially modified in many
jurisdictions. Although URLTA does not require landlords to pay in-
terest on tenants' security deposits, it limits the size of the deposit that a
landlord can demand and provides for punitive damages and attorney's
fees for the tenant if the landlord wrongfully fails to refund a security
deposit." t5 A number of state statutes that preceded URLTA were
passed in the late 1960s or early 1970s and had the same general import
as the URLTA provisions. ' 16
2. Landlord's Duoy to Place Tenant in Actual Possession
Under the former majority American common law position, a land-
lord granted a new tenant only the legal right to possession. If the ten-
ant was unable to take possession because a previous holdover tenant
was wrongfully in possession of the property, the new tenant, not the
landlord, had to resolve the problem.'1 7 In the last twenty years this so-
called American rule has been largely abandoned. 1 8 Although
URLTA is not as clear as it could be, it seems that both URLTA and
the Restatement (Second) of Property impose a duty on the landlord to
place the tenant in actual possession. 19 Under the Restatement Second,
the landlord is liable to the tenant for damages if actual possession is not
available at the proper time.120 Recently, most courts that have ruled on
the question have taken the same position. 12 1
II
CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION
In Part I, I refrained, for the most part, from evaluating the
changes described. Many of them were highly desirable and simply cor-
rected a legal bias favoring landlords. Nevertheless, the question re-
mains why these changes occurred when they did. Although the
revolution has continued to develop to this day, it took its greatest
strides in the period from 1968 to 1974. Therefore, to find an answer to
the question of why the revolution occurred when it did, we must ex-
amine conditions and attitudes in the sixties and early seventies.
115 URLTA § 2.101(a), (c), 7A U.L.A. 524 (1978).
116 See URLTA § 2.101 comment, 7A U.L.A. 524-27 (1978) (citing statutes and dates).
The early modem security deposit acts were passed as follows: New Jersey (1968) (amended
1973); Calfornia (1971) (amended 1977); Texas (1973); Colorado (1971). Yee, supra note 113,
at 139. New Jersey requires the payment of interest on deposits. Id at 139 n.18.
117 See Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930).
118 See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 9, § 3:1-:2.
119 URLTA § 2.103, 7A U.L.A. 528 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
§ 6.2 (1977).
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 6.2(2)(a) (1977).
121 See generally Weissenberger, The Landlord's Duty to Deliver Possession: The Overlooked Re-
form, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 937 (1977).
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A. Housing Conditions and Trends in the Sixties
1. The Physical Realit
By any measure, the American people were better housed in 1968
than they had ever been before. Rich and poor, tenants and homeown-
ers, had shared in the benefits of the substantial improvements that had
occurred over the previous decades. Table I shows that between 1950
and 1970 the proportion of the nation's housing stock that was "dilapi-
dated" decreased by more than fifty percent; the proportion lacking
complete plumbing decreased by more than eighty percent; and the pro-
portion that was overcrowded decreased by almost fifty percent. The
proportion that was over thirty years old decreased from 45.7% in 1950
to 40.6% in 1970.122
A significant improvement in housing conditions occurred even in
central city slums:
Overall, the changes in the 50 low-income neighborhoods indi-
cate some surprising results. The neighborhoods were selected with
an expectation of neighborhood decline, yet it was found that for vir-
tually all neighborhoods studied, housing conditions and real incomes
actually improved. All indices, however, still revealed relatively poor
housing conditions. 123
122 U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEv., NATIONAL HOUSING POLICY REVIEw,
HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES 166 (1974) [hereinafter cited as HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES].
123 Id at 175.
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TABLE 1124
MEASURES OF HOUSING INADEQUACY
1940 1950 1960 1970 1974 1977
Percent of all units
lacking some or all
plumbing
Percent of all units
dilapidated or
needing major
repairs
Percent of all units
substandard:
dilapidated, or
lacking plumbing
Percent of
occupied units
with 1.51 or more
per room
Percent of
occupied units
with 1.01 or more
persons per room
Percent of
occupied units
with one or more
subfamilies
45.2 35.4 16.8 6.5 4.0 3.1
17.8 9.8 6.9 4.6 NA NA
49.2 36.9 18.2 9.0 NA NA
9.0 6.2 3.6 2.0 1.1 0.9
20.2 15.8 11.5 8.0 5.3 4.4
NA NA NA NA 1.5 1.4
Between 1960 and 1970 housing had also become more affordable.
Although the rent-to-income ratios for each income class had risen from
1960 to 1970, this rise is misleading. If one adjusts for inflation and for
changes in the quality of rental housing, income ratios fell from 1960 to
1970. For example, someone earning about $3,500 in 1960 had the same
real income as someone earning $4,500 in 1970.125 That individual's
rent-to-income ratio was 22.3% in 1960 and had risen to 26.7% in
1970.126 However, he or she was eight times more likely to have air-
conditioning, one-third less likely to be overcrowded, and half as likely
to lack plumbing.1 27 Thus, in constant dollars and in terms of compara-
ble quality, rental housing rent-to-income ratios had become more
124 U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEv., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH,
1980 NATIONAL HOUSING PRODUCTION REPORT 24 (Sources: U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DECENNIAL CENSUSES OF HOUSING; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEYS; U.S. DEP'T OF HoUs. AND URBAN
DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH, ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEYS).
125 Ste HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES, supra note 122, at 234-37, especially 237, table 15.
126 Id at 237, table 15.
127 Id.
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favorable for tenants in 1970 than they were in 1960.128
I do not suggest that in 1968 there were no renters living in poor
housing, for millions were. I merely argue that any suggestion of a
growing crisis was mistaken. Housing conditions had improved steadily
and substantially over the decade. The general perception of housing
conditions, however, was very different.
2. As Perceived at the Time
a. The Douglas Commission. In March 1965, President Johnson
called for a commission to study the causes of slums and urban blight,
and to make appropriate recommendations. 2 9 Congress subsequently
authorized such a study, to be completed by December 31, 1968.130 Al-
though the Commission report made passing pro forma reference to the
"great gains in our housing stock,"' 3 1 the dominant message of the re-
port concerned the existence of a housing crisis of great proportions.
The report stated that the complex problem of racial segregation in
housing remained "critical."' 132 The accomplishments of subsidized
housing were "extremely inadequate"'133 and a "squeeze on low-income
families seeking decent housing" existed. 134 The Commission recognized
a "need [for] a new generation of housing codes embracing higher stan-
dards and tied in with environmental standards."' 35 There was also a
"need for a real political commitment to solve our problems,"' 136 which
constituted an "urban crisis."' 137 Indeed, the Commission stated in its
summary: "The solutions we call for are a tall order, but they are in
proportion to the enormity of the problems of our urban areas."' 138
The Commission recommended a startling increase in housing con-
struction. It recommended annual housing production of from 2.0 to
2.25 million housing units per year; 500,000 of those units to be designed
128 See id at 236, table 14. This table indicates that for most types of families (e.g., male-
headed, female-headed, over 65, etc.) rent-to-income ratios had not changed between 1960
and 1970. Because the quality of housing improved significantly during this period (by 27%,
id at 234), the rent-to-income ratio for the same quality housing would have decreased dur-
ing the same period. As the report concludes, for the half of low income families who were
renters, "the available data indicate that rent increases have not adversely affected them." Id
at 237.
129 U.S. NAT'L COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R.
Doc. No. 34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. VII (1978) [hereinafter cited as BUILDING THE AMERICAN
CITY].
130 Id
131 Id at XI.
132 Id
133 Id
134 Id
'35 Id
136 Id
137 Id
138 Id
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specifically for low and moderate income families (exclusive of the eld-
erly). 139 Because the Commission's own statistics indicated that in the
1960s only 15.3 million units were built' 4° (1.53 million per year on av-
erage), the Commission's recommendation would have meant an annual
average increase of 33% in the number of units constructed over the
previous comparable period. It is impossible to sum up a report of 500
pages in a few sentences. Yet the general perception of the Douglas
Commission can be summarized by the following quotation:
At the present levels of family income and at present rentals and
mortgage rates, about a third of the families in the Nation cannot buy
or rent decent housing at market rates by paying a reasonable propor-
tion of their income for shelter (no more than 20 to 25 percent at
most). 14 1
b. The Kaiser Committee. 142 The Kaiser Committee submitted its
report to the President only one day before the Douglas Commission
submitted its report. 143 The Committee first received its charge in June
1967144 and participated in the development of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968145 (passed in August of 1968). 146 The Kaiser
Report, like the Douglas Report, generally saw a crisis in housing:
[T]his Committee reached a fundamental conclusion: . . .
There is an immediate and critical social need for millions of decent
dwellings to shelter the nation's lower-income families.
Overlying this need is one raising an unprecedented and challeng-
ing production problem. The nation is heading toward a serious
shortage of housing for the total population, unless production is
sharply increased. 147
To meet the need described above, the Kaiser Committee recommended
producing twenty-six million new and rehabilitated units by 1978, in-
cluding between six and eight million subsidized units. 148 The report
acknowledged the enormity of this goal, calculating that it required 70%
more housing production in the next decade than the total production
of the 1950s. 149 A staff study appended to the Kaiser Committee report
139 Ad. at 180-81.
140 Id at 70, table 1.
141 Id at 74 (footnote omitted).
142 PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON URBAN Hous., A DECENT HOME (1968) [hereinafter cited
as A DECENT HOME].
143 The Kaiser Committee Report was submitted on Dec. 11, 1968. Id. at i. The Douglas
Commission submitted its report on Dec. 2, 1968. BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY,supra note
129, at III.
144 A DECENT HOME, supra note 142, at i.
145 Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476.
146 A DECENT HOME, supra note 142, at i.
147 Id at 8.
148 Id
149 Id at 8-9.
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acknowledged that housing conditions had improved in the previous few
decades,150 but concluded that "without a major National effort, there is
little prospect for any substantial net gains in the condition of substan-
dard metropolitan area housing in the decade ahead." 151 In President
Johnson's June 2, 1967, statement, forming appendix A to the Kaiser
Committee Report, he described the problem as follows: "No domestic
task facing this Nation today is more demanding or more urgent than
reclaiming the corroded core of the American city. A substantial part of
that task is the rebuilding of the slums-with their 7 million dilapidated
dwellings-which shame this Nation and its cities." 152
Just as the Douglas and Kaiser Reports perceived a housing prob-
lem requiring heroic solutions, so too did judges see a need for brave
new theories and approaches. In the landmarkJavins case Judge Wright
referred to the "increasingly severe shortage of adequate housing" to
justify his new approach.' 53 In support of this reference to an "increas-
ingly severe shortage," he cited the Kaiser Committee Report, and on
related issues cited the Douglas Commission Report. 154 Other leading
cases simply assumed that the growing housing shortage was so self-evi-
dent as not to warrant extended discussion or citation. 155
3. Reconciling the Perception and the Reality
The substantial improvement in the quantity, quality, and af-
fordability of housing in the fifties and sixties is not inconsistent with the
view that heroic measures were urgently needed to improve housing
conditions. The 1968 House Report that accompanied the historic
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 implicitly took this posi-
tion when it recognized prior achievements, but simultaneously depre-
cated them:
While we can take pride in these accomplishments, they have fallen
far short of today's needs .... A basic factor in the magnitude and
urgency of our present housing problems has been the failure to in-
clude all parts of our population in the general rise in incomes and
wealth .... Because of this contrast and the unrest it has created, the
task of our housing and urban development programs is more critical
150 Id at 43.
151 Id at 44.
152 Id at 222.
153 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.) (footnote omitted),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
154 Id
155 See, e.g., Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 625 & n.8, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173 &
n.8, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 & n.8 (1974) (referring to "a scarcity of adequate low cost housing
in virtually every urban setting"); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 146, 265 A.2d 526, 535
(1970) (referring, without elaboration, to "these days of housing shortage').
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than ever. 156
It is not possible, however, to reconcile completely the reality of steadily
improving housing conditions with the perception of an increasingly se-
vere shortage of housing. In 1968, the public consensus seemed to hold
that housing conditions were actually getting worse, whereas in fact,
they were getting better. Smaller shortcomings loomed larger in the
eyes of the observer in 1968 than larger shortcomings had loomed in the
eyes of earlier observers. We had developed an increased sensitivity to
the gap between the reality and the ideal; a reduced tolerance for
imperfections.
4. The Practical Efefct of the Decreased Tolerance for Shortcomings in
the Nation ' Housing
In enacting the landmark Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968, t57 Congress explicitly adopted as a national goal the Kaiser Com-
mittee's recommendation to produce or rehabilitate 26 million housing
units over the next ten years.' 58  Although the goal was not fully
achieved, Congress vastly increased housing expenditures, and housing
programs proliferated in the years following the 1968 Act.' 59 Similarly,
the general perception of a housing crisis contributed to the develop-
ment of new judicial doctrines and to the drafting of the Model Code of
1969. The Model Code served as the basis for URLTA, which in turn
became an important force for change in the seventies.
B. What Made Formerly Tolerable Housing Conditions Now
Intolerable?
1. The Civil Rights Movement
A major thesis of this article is that the civil rights movement of the
sixties was the dominant force behind the changes in landlord-tenant
law in the late sixties and early seventies.I'° It created a climate of ac-
156 H.R. REP. No. 1585, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, repornted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2873, 2873-74.
157 Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476.
158 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, § 1601, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (1976); see
supra note 148 and accompanying text.
159 Federally subsidized low and moderate income occupancy of unrehabilitated living
units rose from 48,620 in 1971 to 149,030 in 1979. The high point was reached in 1978 when
287,710 such units were subsidized. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEv., THE TENTH
ANNUAL REPORT ON THE NATIONAL HOUSING GOAL 29 (1979).
160 That the Canadian province of Ontario passed legislation embodying many of the
changes discussed in this article even before most of the American changes took place seems to
refute this proposition. See The Landlord and Tenant Amendment Act, ch. 58, 1968-69 Ont.
Stat. 441, discussed in Gorsky, The Landlord and Tenant Amendment Act, 1968-69--Some Problems
of StatutoVy Interpretation, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REAL ESTATE LAw 439 (Law Society
of Upper Canada, Special Lectures 1970). Because Canada was not as affected by the civil
rights movement or the Vietnam War as was the United States, it would seem that the move-
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tivism that demanded prompt, dramatic changes. Judges and legisla-
tors responded accordingly.
Although the post World War II civil rights struggle started as a
movement against segregation and blatant racism in the South, by the
early 1960s, it had assumed a more national character. The national
character of the movement perhaps had its symbolic beginning on Janu-
ary 1, 1963, when Martin Luther King, Jr., made his immortal "I have a
dream" speech to commemorate the centennial of the Emancipation
Proclamation. 161 On August 28, 1963, some 200,000 people, black and
white, from the North and South, marched on Washington to demon-
strate their support for racial justice.162 In March 1964, President John-
son declared a "national war on poverty"'163 and in July 1964, he signed
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law. 164 These efforts, however, did not
succeed in halting the militant phase of the civil rights movement,
which had already begun. There were riots in black sections of New
York and Philadelphia that summer. 165
Violent civil rights protests escalated dramatically in the summer of
1965. The riots in the Watts section of Los Angeles left thirty-four per-
sons dead and $40 million in property destroyed. 166 In the summer of
1967, there were race riots in Cleveland, Chicago, and Atlanta. 167 In
the summer of 1967, there were riots in 127 American cities, killing at
least 77 and injuring at least 4,000 people. 16 In Detroit the disturbances
were so severe that federal troops were called in-the first use of federal
troops to maintain order since 1942.169 Significantly, in view of the
leading role the courts in Washington, D. C. were to play in landlord-
tenant law, there was also an episode of arson and rock throwing in that
city. 170
No judge sitting in Washington in 1968 could fail to have been
affected by the civil rights movement unfolding before him-least of all
Judge J. Skelly Wright. James Skelly Wright was born and raised in
ment for change in landlord-tenant law generated from other sources in Canada. Although
this might suggest that change in landlord-tenant law would have occurred in the United
States even without these two social forces, I still would argue that the catalyst for change in
the United States was the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War. I freely concede,
however, that if these two events had not occurred other events probably would have precipi-
tated these changes in landlord-tenant law. The anachronistic law of landlord-tenant was a
tinderbox waiting to be ignited by a spark that could originate from any number of sources.
161 J. TRAGER, THE PEOPLE'S CHRONOLOGY 1096 (1979).
162 Id
163 Id at 1102.
164 Id at 1101.
165 Id
166 Id at 1108.
167 Id at 1114.
168 Id at 1120.
169 Id
170 Id
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New Orleans and received his college and law school education at
Loyola University in that city.17 1 After practicing law first as an assis-
tant U.S. Attorney and then as a U.S. Attorney, he was appointed a
United States District Judge in 1949.172 In his work in the federal courts
in New Orleans, he was intimately involved in desegregation law, and
from his earliest days on the bench had shown a sensitivity to the de-
mands of black citizens for equal treatment.
Even before Brown v. Board of Education1 73 was decided in 1954,
Judge Wright twice ordered Louisiana State University to admit black
students to its programs. 174 In 1960, he became known in New Orleans
as the "integration judge" when he became the first judge in the deep
South to order desegregation of the public schools.175
Judge Wright was elevated to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia by President Kehnedy and began sitting
there in 1962.176 The court during that period heard, among other mat-
ters, appeals involving landlord-tenant disputes that arose in the District
of Columbia. 177 Only six years after his appointment, Judge Wright
wrote his important opinion barring retaliatory evictions. 178 And only
two years later, he wrote his landmarkJavins opinion. During the years
immediately preceding these opinions many significant events had oc-
curred including the march on Washington, the race riots throughout
the country, the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964179 and 1968,180
and the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. In a candid letter to
me, Judge Wright acknowledged that his opinions in the landlord-ten-
ant area were influenced by sympathy for the black struggle of those
171 J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 113 (1981).
172 Id at 113-14.
173 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
174 J. BASS, supra note 171, at 114.
175 Id at 114-15.
By the end of 1960, Skelly Wright had become the most hated man in
New Orleans. Pairs of federal marshals alternated in eight-hour shifts at his
home to ensure his physical safety, and they escorted him to and from work.
With few exceptions, old friends would step across the street to avoid speaking
to him.
Id at 115.
176 See Letter from Judge Wright to author (Oct. 14, 1981), infra p. 549.
177 Id After February 1, 1971, Judge Wright's court no longer heard appeals in District
of Columbia landlord-tenant cases. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-102, 11-301 (1981); cf Davis
v. Bruner, 441 A.2d 992, 997 (D.C.), vacated, 441 A.2d 1000 (D.C. 1982).
178 Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
179 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 240 (1965).
180 Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1969).
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years. It is reasonable to assume that other judges were similarly influ-
enced.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001-2867
J. Skelly Wright
United States Circuit Judge
October 14, 1982
Professor Edward H. Rabin
School of Law
University of California, Davis
Davis, California 95616
Dear Professor Rabin:
Why the revolution in landlord-tenant law is largely traceable to
the 1960's rather than decades before I really cannot say with any
degree of certainty. Unquestionably the Vietnam War and the civil
rights movement of the 1960's did cause people to question existing
institutions and authorities. And perhaps this inquisition reached the
judiciary itself. Obviously, judges cannot be unaware of what all peo-
ple know and feel.
With reference to your specific question, I was indeed influenced
by the fact that, during the nationwide racial turmoil of the sixties
and the unrest caused by the injustice of racially selective service in
Vietnam, most of the tenants in Washington, D.C. slums were poor
and black and most of the landlords were rich and white. There is no
doubt in my mind that these conditions played a subconscious role in
influencing my landlord and tenant decisions.
I came to Washington in April 1962 after being born and raised
in New Orleans, Louisiana for 51 years. I had never been exposed,
either as a judge or as a lawyer, to the local practice of law which, of
course, included landlord and tenant cases. I was Assistant U.S. At-
torney, U.S. Attorney, and then U.S. District Court judge in New Or-
leans before I joined the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington. It was
my first exposure to landlord and tenant cases, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals here being a writ court to the local court system at the time. I
didn't like what I saw, and I did what I could to ameliorate, if not
eliminate, the injustice involved in the way many of the poor were
required to live in the nation's capital.
I offer no apology for not following more closely the legal prece-
dents which had cooperated in creating the conditions that I found
unjust.
Sincerely,
s/J. Skelly Wright
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2. Other Causes
No historical event has a single cause. Although the civil rights
movement was primarily responsible for breaking the precedents that
had encased landlord-tenant law for centuries, other forces were also at
work.
a. Resistance to the Vietnam War. During the sixties, opposition to
the Vietnam War occupied a dominant place in American political con-
sciousness. By the end of 1966 the American death toll in Vietnam had
reached 6,407.181 By April of 1967 antiwar demonstrations had at-
tracted over 100,000 people in New York and 50,000 people in San
Francisco. 182 By March of 1968 opposition to the war had become so
intense that President Johnson had been compelled to announce that he
would not run for reelection. 183
Although foreign policy appears to have little to do with landlord-
tenant law, the antiwar protestors' dramatic victory over the authority
and legitimacy of the "Establishment" influenced the American polit-
ical atmosphere. Landlords represented the Establishment, and the ex-
isting rules of landlord-tenant law, archaic and one-sided as they were,
represented as much a legitimate target of protest by lawyers and judges
as did the perceived wrongheadedness of the Vietnam military adven-
ture. This theme of unrest and change reflected itself in our culture,
music, mores, and laws. It was a time of flower children in the Haight,
of student riots in the universities, and of rent strikes in our cities.
b. Institutional Changes. Reapportionment decisions eased the way
for statutory changes in the state legislatures.8 4  As state legislatures
increasingly reflected their urban constituencies, the grievances of urban
tenants received a more respectful hearing in the legislatures. Without
the reapportionment of state legislatures that occurred in the sixties,
some of the ameliorative legislation, particularly URLTA, might not
have been passed. 185 Yet, reapportionment merely removed an obstacle
in the way of reform. It did not provide the underlying motivation.
After all, neither the drafting of the original Model Residential Land-
lord-Tenant Code nor the adoption of URLTA by the National Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws was affected by the composition of
the state legislatures.
The establishment and relatively generous funding of legal services
181 L. OBsT, THE SIXTIES 166 (1977).
182 J. TRAGER, SUpra note 161, at 1119.
183 Id at 126.
184 See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assem-
bly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
185 See Donahue, supra note 2, at 242.
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offices, supported by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) in
most urban areas represented a more important institutional develop-
ment.18 6 These offices, staffed by idealistic and energetic lawyers, par-
ticipated in most of the test cases establishing tenants' rights. 187 It is
doubtful whether many of these cases would have been brought without
the support of legal services. A glance through the Clearinghouse Re-
view18 indicates the extent to which landlord-tenant law occupies legal
service lawyers, and the high level of legal talent and expertise these
lawyers offered tenants in the sixties and seventies.
c. Developments in Legal Theoty, Precedents, and Legislation. Every
revolution has roots that lead us further back into the past; every discov-
ery its portents, every event its heralds. Cases likeJavins and Edwards v.
Habib were not totally without precedent. They had been preceded by a
large literature of legal articles criticizing the outmoded nature of land-
lord-tenant law,' 89 by cases that had taken similar paths, 19° and by the
increased use of housing codes that could be used to establish a defini-
tion of habitability. 191 These pre-1968 factors were important in facili-
tating change, yet all of them had existed before the start of the
revolution in 1968. They had all prepared the way for change, but the
revolution in landlord-tenant law could not have occurred without the
emotional force generated by the civil rights movement, particularly by
the violent confrontational phase that developed in the sixties. Never-
theless, a review of these earlier developments is essential to a full under-
standing of the reasons for the breakthrough of the late 1960s.
The first influential American housing code was passed in New
York in 1867.192 By 1956, approximately fifty-six communities had
housing codes, but by 1968 the number had grown to 4,904 communi-
ties, not including statewide housing codes. 193 One can trace the sudden
change from the glacial pace of growth in local housing codes from 1867
to 1956, to the extraordinary growth from 1956 to 1968, directly to the
passage of the federal Housing Act of 1954. The Act required local ju-
risdictions to enforce housing codes if they were to qualify for federal
186 The key statute establishing the OEO was the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508.
187 For example, the reported decisions forJavins, Edwards v. Habib, Green, and Marini
indicate that "public interest" lawyers filed briefs for all of these leading cases.
188 The Clearinghouse Review is a national journal serving poverty lawyers.
189 See, e.g., Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1279 (1960); Quinn &
Phillips, The Law of Landlord- Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelinesfor the Future,
38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969); Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposals for
Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519 (1969).
190 See inlra notes 195-201.
191 See generalo L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HoUSING (1968).
192 Id at 26.
193 Abbott, supra note 6, at 44.
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aid.' 94 Hence, local ordinances were more a response to a need per-
ceived in Washington, than to the impetus of local forces. Whatever the
motivation for the adoption of local housing codes, by the timeJavins
was decided in 1970, housing codes were widespread, detailed, and fa-
miliar enough to serve as a ready standard with which to judge the hab-
itability of rental units.
Despite the existence of housing codes before 1954, few courts used
them to define the rights of tenants. Although a few decisions founded
tort liability for personal injury on a landlord's breach of a housing
code,195 this was a far cry from the use of housing codes to define the
contractual rights of landlords and tenants. One early case, Delamater v.
Foreman, 196 found an implied warranty of habitability in a modern
apartment, but did not rely on, or even mention, any housing code.
In Pines v. Perssion, a 1961 case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied
on a building code to find an implied warranty of habitability, and thus
reject that "obnoxious legal cliche, caveat emptor. '1 97 The tenants in
Pines had a reasonable good faith belief that the property would be hab-
itable when they moved in. When it proved otherwise, they moved out.
Although the court found several building code violations, the plaintiffs'
most compelling argument was the failure of the property to meet their
justified expectations. Nevertheless, the court formally rested its deci-
sion on the landlord's failure to fulfill the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity as defined by the building code. Pines was important because it was
one of the first cases to find an implied warranty of habitability based
on a building code. Moreover, it expressly held that the obligation to
pay rent and the landlord's implied warranty of habitability were "mu-
tually dependent"'' 9 and that a "breach of the latter. . . relieved [ten-
ants] of any liability under the former."' 199 The tenants were thus
relieved of any liability under the lease and the "only liability [was] for
the reasonable rental value of the premises during the time of actual
occupancy. ' 200 The tenants actually vacated the premises only a few
days after they moved in, and thus the court was not confronted with
the critical issue which came to play a central role in subsequent cases:
When a landlord breaches an implied warranty of habitability, can a
tenant remain on the premises, refuse to pay rent, and successfully de-
fend against an eviction action brought by the landlord? The clear ma-
194 Id at 43.
195 See, e.g., Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Dolan v. Suffolk Franklin Say. Bank, 355 Mass. 665, 246 N.E.2d 798 (1969).
196 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931).
197 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1961).
198 Id
199 Id
200 Id at 597, 111 N.W.2d at 413.
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jority view today is that the tenant can, but prior to 1968 there was little
authority to support such a position.
The Pines case never achieved the influence ofJavins. The time was
not yet ripe. The civil rights movement had not developed sufficient
force to compel other judges to follow Pines. Some inkling of the relative
unimportance of Pines in the overall slum housing context is exhibited
by the failure of Professor Lawrence M. Friedman, who was a professor
of law at Wisconsin when he wrote his classic study, Government and Slum
Housing, to mention or cite Pines (a Wisconsin case) at any point in his
book. Indeed, he gave scant attention to the possibility that a reforma-
tion of landlord-tenant law could significantly improve the housing of
poor tenants. Nevertheless, Pines was not entirely without impact. It
was cited and quoted with approval inJavins, 20 and no doubt made the
writing of theJavins opinion somewhat easier than it would have other-
wise been. Nevertheless, one suspects thatJavis would have been de-
cided the same way even if Pines had never been written. As Judge
Wright has acknowledged, "[I]f you don't take it to extremes, I think
that it's good to come out with a fair and just result and then look for
law to support it. ' '202
Legal developments in areas other than landlord-tenant law also
made it easier to imply a warranty in rental housing.20 3 Courts previ-
ously had found implied warranties in the sale of real and personal
property.2° To deny implied warranties in rental housing, courts would
have had to retain a doctrine that had become an exception to a general
rule recognizing implied warranties in other contexts. If the courts had
wished, however, they could have logically defended the exception.
Courts could have distinguished the rental of used housing, which might
be assumed to have certain defects, and the sale or rental of new real or
personal property, which might logically be presumed to lack such de-
fects. That Judge Wright chose not to draw such a distinction does not
suggest that he decidedJavins illogically. It suggests rather that his de-
sire to respond to a perceived necessity of the time was a more important
motivating factor than any instinct for logic-chopping.
d. Economic Causes. During the fifties and sixties the United States
experienced rapid growth and prosperity. In constant 1972 dollars, per
201 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 & n.60 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
202 J. BAss, supra note 171, at 116.
203 See generallv Backman, Tenant as Consumer.- Comparison of Developments in Consumer Law
and in Landlord/Tenant Law, 33 OKIA. L. REV. 1 (1980).
204 See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 370-84, 161 A.2d 69, 76-
84 (1960) (implied warranty in new automobile); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D.
57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967) (implied warranty in new house). Both of these cases were cited in
Javins, 428 F.2d at 1076 nn.19, 22.
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capita income had risen from $3,069 in 1960 to $4,265 in 1970.205 Poor
families had shared in the dramatic rise in living standards. In 1950,
50.4% of all families had had an income of less than $10,000, stated in
constant 1979 dollars.20 6 By 1960, the percentage had fallen to 32.4%,207
by 1970, to only 21.3%.20 At the upper end of the income scale, only
1.1% of all families had an income of over $50,000 in 1955 stated in
constant 1979 dollars, whereas 3.7% of all families had such income in
1970.209 Against this background of rising affluence, the continued
existence of slums seemed shameful and unnecessary. 210 The general
prosperity made it seem feasible to launch and win a "war against pov-
erty" that would have been unthinkable in a period of economic strin-
gency. Judges and legislators believed that landlords could afford to
give up some of their profits for the benefit of slum dwellers because the
landlord's economic position, like that of everyone else, was improving.
C. Summary
Many factors contributed to the revolution in landlord-tenant law
that arose in the late sixties. The primary factor, however, was the civil
rights movement of the sixties, the turbulence of which impelled judges
and legislatures to do "something" about poor housing conditions in the
slums. The federal government responded to those societal forces with
the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and. the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968. The courts and state legislatures responded by changing
existing legal doctrines, in particular by recognizing an implied war-
ranty of habitability in rental housing.
D. The Special Cases of Rent Control and Condominium
Conversion Legislation
1. Rent Control
Inflation is the primary force stimulating the passage of rent control
ordinances. Rent control ordinances attempt to protect tenants from
inflation. Legislatures are unlikely to consider rent control until infla-
tion becomes a problem. Typically such ordinances freeze rents with
205 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1981, at 429 [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1981].
206 Id at 439.
207 Id
208 Id
209 Id
210 John Kenneth Galbraith's influential book, The Ajkuent Society, written in 1958 could
not have been written in earlier decades, nor indeed at the present time. Yet in 1958 Dr.
Galbraith could justifiably write about the "great and quite unprecedented affluence" of his
time. J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 1 (1958). The major theme of Galbraith's
book was that there was sufficient wealth in the country to make poverty unnecessary. Thus,
it prepared the intellectual ground for the "war on poverty" that started a decade latter.
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increases permitted only under narrowly circumscribed conditions. In
the absence of inflation, or more specifically in the absence of any rise in
rents, no need or purpose for rent control would exist. Although, to be
constitutional, rent control laws must permit the landlord to achieve a
fair return on his investment, rent control ordinances do not establish
rents by calculating the rents needed to earn a fair return. Instead, they
assume that market rents at some previous time were fair and reason-
able, and then use these market rents as the starting point for calculat-
ing permitted rents. The formula equates earlier market rents, as
adjusted, with permitted rents. The rapid inflation of the late 1960s and
early 1970s led Congress to impose federal rent controls from August 15,
1971, through January 12, 1973.211 State and local rent control ordi-
nances became popular at about this time, in some cases designed to
replace the expired federal statute.
The popularity of rent control is puzzling in view of the virtual
unanimity among professional economists that rent control is, in the
long run, bad for all concerned-tenants as well as landlords. As Lud-
wig von Mises explained in 1949:
Economics does not say that isolated government interference
with the prices of only one commodity or a few commodities is unfair,
bad, or unfeasible. It says that such interference produces results con-
trary to its purpose, that it makes conditions worse, not betterfrom the
point of view of the government and those backing its interference. 212
Despite such views on rent control, tenants continue to vote for it. Are
renters who vote for rent control simply shortsighted and ill-informed? I
think there is a better explanation. Although rent control is bad for
renters taken as a whole, it is good for the particular subgroup of tenants
that votes on the measure and bad for the subgroup of tenants that does
not vote. Rent control benefits those of the "tenant class" who are now
tenants, at the expense of those who will become tenants later. These
include nonresidents, those who are too young to establish independent
households, and those who are currently homeowners and plan to be-
come tenants.
Significantly, the two groups most adversely affected-nonresidents
and those too young to be tenants-are not voters when such measures
are passed by a local government. Consequently, their interests are ig-
nored. Seen in this light, rent control bears a startling resemblance to
exclusionary zoning, which often masquerades as environmental protec-
tion.213 Similarly, rent control is often deceptively portrayed as protec-
tion for the poor or as a restraint on exorbitant landlord profits.
211 See generally R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 9, at 503.
212 INST. OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, VERDICT ON RENT CONTROL 61 (1972) (quoting von
Mises) (emphasis in original).
213 See generally B. FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE (1979).
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However, both exclusionary zoning and rent control operate, in effect if
not in intent, against the interests of those who cannot vote and in favor
of the interests of those who can and do vote. For the current tenant,
the immediate and certain advantage of rent control usually outweighs
the speculative future disadvantages, particularly when the future disad-
vantages are discounted to present value.
When viewed from the perspective of those who vote for and are
benefited by rent control ordinances, the reasons for certain common
features of these ordinances become clear. Consider, for example, the
common provision that allows a landlord to increase rents on a decon-
trolled apartment after the original tenants vacate.2 14 If an ordinance is
concerned with preventing exorbitant profits for landlords at the ex-
pense of tenants, it should protect new tenants as much as existing ten-
ants. But because such ordinances are passed at the request or by the
vote of existing tenants, protection of new tenants is not an issue central
to the supporters of rent control. In those instances where vacancy de-
control is opposed, the opposition is mainly to protect existing tenants
from landlord pressure to vacate and thus decontrol their unit. The new
tenant's need for protection is distinctly secondary. Similarly, most of
the modern "second generation" rent control ordinances exempt from
control living units constructed after the ordinance. Legislators give
short shrift to the interests of future residents because they are unlikely
to be voters in the election adopting the rent control ordinance.
Considering that rent control benefits that class of tenants who are
likely to be voters-current tenants-at the expense of those who are
not presently voters-the young and nonresidents-the popularity of
rent control in the last ten years is not surprising.
2. Legislation Restricting Condominium Conversions
To find the causes of condominium conversion legislation, we must
first investigate the causes of condominium conversions. Some condo-
minium conversions are inspired by rent control. Landlords seeking to
escape the strictures of rent control may try to convert their rental
properties to condominiums. The same voters, current tenants, who
used political power to enact a rent control ordinance will seek to pre-
vent condominium conversions that threaten the gains they previously
won.
2 15
214 See, e.g., Los ANGELES, CAL. MUN. CODE § 151.06.C (1981); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
ADMIN. CODE § 37.3(b) (1980); SAN JOSE, CAL. SAN JOSE MUN. CODE § 5703.3(b) (1979).
215 As the court in Flynn v. City of Cambridge, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 692, 699, 418
N.E.2d 335, 339 (1981), observed:
Even if the conversion rate did no more than level off, the power conferred by
[the statute] to control rents would steadily and irreversibly be transformed
into the power to control nothing. The power to control rents and evictions is
not so illusory that it does not comprehend the right and responsibility of
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Often, a conversion is a defensive move by a landlord who fears
enactment of rent control and accompanying condominium conversion
legislation. Condominium conversions, however, may occur even in the
absence of rent control legislation or the threat of it.
Condominium conversions occur when they are profitable for the
converter. This happens when the anticipated discounted value of the
net after-tax income stream from the operation of a rental property is
less than the anticipated discounted value of the net after-tax income
that will flow from a conversion. Thus, anything that tends to depress
rents or increase the price of condominiums will encourage conversions.
A recent report closely studied the causes of condominium conver-
sions.216 The report concluded that most condominium conversions
arose in response to a strong demand by purchasers for condominium
units, rather than to depressed rent levels. 217 During the seventies, the
advantages of home ownership (including condominiums and coops)
over tenancy became stronger. The change in advantage was
largely a result of actual and expected future inflation (including fu-
ture appreciation of housing values and the greater tax advantages of
ownership for households pushed by inflation into higher marginal
income tax brackets). Inflation of housing prices has, at the same
time, placed traditional single-family homes beyond the financial
reach of more middle income households. Thus, inflation-combined
with Federal tax laws-works both to increase ownership demand and
to reduce the ability of many households to purchase single-family
homes. Condominiums and cooperatives-including those converted
from rentals-offer a less expensive ownership alternative at a time
when more are seeking to own rather than to rent. For this reason, if
for no other, demand for converted condominiums and cooperatives
would be expected to grow and to create new profit opportunities for
converters. 2 18
The above discussion explains why condominium conversion legis-
lation and rent control legislation arose at about the same time. Both
were responses to inflation. Conversions became popular when inflation
made condominium purchases attractive to housing consumers. Dra-
matic rises in rents and in the costs of home purchases came with the
inflation of the seventies. Renters responded to the rent rises by sponsor-
ing rent control legislation, and to the conversions by sponsoring condo-
minium conversion legislation. Housing consumers who were hurt by
condominium conversion legislation were politically disorganized as
preventing removals from its reach. We conclude that the power to control
removals from the rental housing market is essential to the operation of [the
statute,] and is therefore conferred by implication in the rent control statute.
216 CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING, supra note 94.
217 Id. at V-3, -15, -19, -30.
218 Id at V-30 (footnotes omitted).
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compared to tenants who could work together easily because they lived
in the same apartment house or neighborhood. Consumers thus could
do little to voice their disapproval.
III
EFFECT OF THE REVOLUTION IN LANDLORD-TENANT LAW
ON HOUSING CONDITIONS
The revolution in landlord-tenant law was one in which courts and
legislatures attempted to improve housing conditions for tenants. Many
critics of the revolution argued that regardless of intent, the revolution
would hurt tenants more than it would help them. This Part examines
this proposition.
A. The Literature21 9
1. Theoretical Studies and Predictions
a. Mainstream Analyses. It is arguable that each increased tenant
protection and landlord duty must ultimately be paid for by the con-
sumers of rental housing, the tenants. 220 Those least able to pay in-
creased rents will lose more than they gain from additional protections.
Illustrative of this view is an influential article by Charles Meyers.
22 1
Professor Meyers addressed the following fact pattern, adapted from one
posed by the Restatement (Second) of Property: 222
Landlord leases an apartment to Tenant on a month-to-month
basis for $30 per month. The apartment is located in a slum and does
not comply with the housing code in several important respects. Both
Landlord and Tenant are aware of the violations but agree to enter
into the lease anyway.
2 23
Under the Restatement Second rule, as ultimately adopted, the landlord
219 I have not attempted to review the periodical literature addressed primarily to
economists. Enough has been written in legal periodicals and in general works to furnish food
for thought.
220 If landlords enjoy greater than average profits, the costs of increased tenant protec-
tion, even in the long run, may be borne by landlords. Moreover, even if the rental housing
business is competitive and landlords enjoy only average profits, the suppliers of the factors of
production such as the owners of raw land, might bear some of the costs of increased tenant
protection. Such owners might find that the prices they can command are reduced when
landlords have additional expenses due to greater tenant protection. Thus, the costs of in-
creased tenant protections may fall most heavily on landlords in the short run, on tenants in
the medium run, and on the suppliers of the factors of production (land, capital, supplies) in
the long run.
221 Meyers, The Covenant of Habitabili and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. REv. 879
(1975).
222 The quoted fact pattern was derived from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY § 5.1 comment c, illustration 2 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1974). The final version of the
Restatement Second on this point is identical. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1
comment c, illustration 2 (1977).
223 Meyers, supra note 221, at 879.
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would still have a duty of providing habitable premises. If the landlord
breaches this duty, the tenant would be entitled to the usual contract
remedies resulting from an agreement that is "unconscionable or signifi-
cantly against public policy. ' 224 Professor Meyers summarized his ob-
jections to the Restatement Second's position as follows:
In summary, the economic consequences of the Restatement rules
on habitability are likely to be the following:
1) Some proportion of the substandard rental housing stock
would be upgraded and rents would be raised to cover the added
costs. Tenants formerly occupying the housing would either be forced
out or be required to pay a higher proportion of their income for rent.
Those tenants who are unable or unwilling to pay for the upgraded
housing will move out, creating an increased demand for lower-
priced, lower-quality housing.
2) For some proportion of the substandard rental housing stock,
rents could not be raised, but landlords could still upgrade the hous-
ing without incurring a deficit. In these cases the tenants would enjoy
a short-term wealth transfer, for they would enjoy better housing at
no increase in rent. But low-income tenants as a class would not bene-
fit in the long run, for the covenant of habitability will retire this com-
ponent of the housing stock sooner than would otherwise be the case
and will discourage new investment in low-rent housing.
3) The third portion of the substandard housing stock will be
abandoned as soon as the owner determines that income will not
cover the expenses of Restatement repairs and concludes that this deficit
is likely to persist.225
Other commentators have held similar views.226
b. Dissident Theories. Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to
demonstrate that under certain conditions code enforcement could im-
prove housing conditions without leading to increased rents was an arti-
cle by Professor Bruce Ackerman. 227 The Ackerman article was the
subject of an extremely critical review by Professor Komesar. 228 It is
224 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.6 (1977); see also id. § 5.1 comment c.
225 Meyers, supra note 221, at 893.
226 See, e.g., Hartman, Kessler & LeGates, Municipal Housing Code Enforcement and Low-In-
come Tenants, 40 J. AM. INST. OF PLANNERS 90 (1974), reprinted in HOUSING URBAN AMERICA
560 (J. Pynoos, R. Schafer & C. Hartman eds. 2d ed. 1980); L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 191, at
174 (1968); Berger, supra note 3, at 749 ("To a great extent the laws are self-defeating. It is
likely that as a result of them there will be less rental housing and that certainly means higher
rents.").
227 Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Hous-
ing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing]; see also Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and Redistribution
Polig.- A Rep'y to Professor Komesar, 82 YALE L.J. 1194 (1973).
228 Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code Enforce-
ment and the Poor, 82 YALE LJ. 1175 (1973).
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unnecessary to repeat here the substance of the criticism. It is sufficient
to note that even Professor Ackerman recognized that poor tenants
would benefit from housing code enforcement only given certain as-
sumptions. Among the more questionable of these is the assumption
that non-slum-dwellers will refrain from moving into former slum build-
ings after they are brought up to code standards.2 29 This assumption is
crucial because if upgrading a slum building attracted persons who
would not otherwise live in the building, rents would rise and the origi-
nal slum-dwellers might be harmed rather than helped by the upgrad-
ing. Even if Professor Ackerman's assumption is valid in some cases, he
ignores the possibility that existing residents of a slum area, who might
otherwise choose to leave when their income permits, would be more
likely to stay if the area or building were brought up to code. If this
latter possibility occurred-as it surely has in some cases2 30 -rents in the
slum area would rise due to increased demand, and the poorer slum-
dwellers still might be injured rather than helped by the code enforce-
ment program.
Another article, written by Professor Markovitz, also defends hous-
ing codes. 23 1 Markovitz argued that a code enforcement program would
normally benefit tenants more than it would hurt them. Markovitz's
analysis, however, is fatally flawed. At most, he proves only that certain
tenants will be helped by a code enforcement program more than cer-
tain other tenants will be injured. His model measures the magnitude of
the benefit by the dollars that benefited tenants would have paid for the
improvement had payment been required. The model measures the
magnitude of the detriment by the dollars that would be necessary to
compensate the injured tenants for the detrimental effects of code en-
forcement. Assuming that Markovitz's analysis is correct and that the
dollar amount of the former is greater than the dollar amount of the
latter, this still leaves the injured tenants worse off than before code en-
forcement because code enforcement programs do not provide a mecha-
nism by which benefited tenants compensate injured tenants. In
Markovitz's model, the injured tenants are the poorest tenants, and the
benefited tenants are the wealthier tenants. In fact, the poorer the ten-
ant, the more he will be injured by the code enforcement program.
Code enforcement programs presumably attempt to ameliorate the
housing deficiencies faced by the poorest members of society.23 2 Because
229 Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing, supra note 227, at 1102-03.
230 The process of affluent people returning to slum areas is so widespread that it has
received a name: gentrification. Seegeneral'y D. BRYANT & H. MCGEE, GENTRIFICATION AND
THE LAW: COMBATTING URBAN DISPLACEMENT (1980). If gentrification is as widespread as
this work suggests, then Ackerman's assumption is clearly unfounded.
231 Markovitz, The Distributive Impact, Allocative Ejiieny, and Overall Desirability of Ideal
Housing Codes.- Some Theoretical Clariftations, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1815 (1976).
232 It is possible to argue, of course, that code enforcement programs are not meant pri-
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Markovitz's analysis implicitly recognizes that the poorest tenants are
hurt rather than helped by such programs, his article hardly provides
powerful support for code enforcement programs. Although Professor
Markovitz would surely argue to the contrary, his article tends to sup-
port the mainstream position that code enforcement policies will hurt
more than help poor tenants.
B. An Alternative Analysis
The mainstream analysis was undoubtedly correct in predicting
that vigorous code enforcement would tend to discourage the preserva-
tion or production of housing and thus tend to create a scarcity of rental
housing. This tendency, however, was outweighed by other factors that
improved rental housing conditions. During the seventies all income
classes of tenants enjoyed more spacious accommodations with better
facilities and lower rents, after adjusting for inflation and differences in
quality. Rental housing improved because during the seventies housing
consumers developed a heightened preference for ownership status over
rental status. 233 This benefited those consumers who remained as ten-
ants because less competition existed for rental housing. Conversely, the
change in consumer preferences discouraged landlords from building
new unsubsidized housing units,234 and tended to depress rents and
marily to help the poor, but rather to benefit the middle class, by reducing the negative
externalities generated by slum housing. Similarly, it can be argued that code enforcement
primarily benefits the middle class by requiring the conversion of housing for the poor into
middle class housing, thus increasing the supply of the latter, and benefiting the middle class
at the expense of the poor. Indeed, it has been suggested that this may in fact be the covert
purpose of much code legislation. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 357 (2d ed.
1977).
233 From 1970 to 1977 the percentage of all households that were owned (as opposed to
rented) increased from 62.9% to 64.8%. More important, all of the increase took place in the
top three quartiles of income. In the lower quartile of income the percentage of homeowners
actually fell from 49.9% to 46.5%. The greatest increase in home ownership occurred in the
highest quartile of income, from 78.7% in 1970 to 85.5% in 1977. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND
URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, 1980 NATIONAL HOUSING PRODUC-
TION REPORT 34 (1980). The flight of high income people from renter to owner status re-
duced the effective demand for rental units, thus tending to depress rents, to the benefit of
those persons who remained renters.
The increased preference for ownership as opposed to renter status was caused partly by
growing affluence. Generally, people prefer to be owners rather than renters, and will
purchase when they can afford it. The high inflation rate of the seventies was also an impor-
tant factor encouraging ownership status. During the seventies a greater precentage of the
population entered higher income tax brackets ("bracket creep"), thus making the income tax
advantages of home ownership for them more pronounced. Moreover, because owners could
profit from inflation and renters could only suffer from it, inflation encouraged ownership as
opposed to rental status.
234 The percentage of all multifamily starts that were federally subsidized rose from 22%
in 1972 to an estimated 44% in 1979. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, RENTAL HOUSING: A NATIONAL PROBLEM THAT NEEDS IM-
MEDIATE ATTENTION 24 (1979).
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profits of landlords.235
Regardless of any change in consumer preferences, the long-term
trend toward improved housing conditions and living standards contin-
ued. Also, during the seventies there was a massive increase in housing
subsidies for the poor.236 If the revolution in landlord-tenant law af-
fected the supply of rental housing detrimentally, the countervailing
combination of generally improving living standards, increased housing
subsidies, and changes in consumer preferences provided a more signifi-
cant beneficial effect.
On the other hand, four facts seem to support the prediction of
mainstream analysts that increased tenants' rights would tend to cause a
shortage of rental housing, with a concomitant increase in average rents.
During the seventies: (1) tenants' average rent-to-income ratios in-
creased significantly; (2) the rental housing business became less profita-
ble; (3) construction of unsubsidized rental housing units fell, relative to
construction of other housing; (4) vacancy rates decreased. If inter-
preted properly, however, none of these facts indicates a growing
shortage of rental housing. The rise in rent-to-income ratios and the fall
in profitability and construction of rental housing were primarily the
result of a reduced demand for rental housing by the more affluent seg-
ment of housing consumers. Similarly, the decrease in vacancy rates
during the seventies is not a positive indicator of a growing housing
shortage.
1. Increased Space Per Person and Falling Rents Indicate that Demand
Did Not Grow as Rapidly as Supply
During the seventies, rents rose more slowly than inflation.237 Be-
tween 1970 and 1979, the constant quality gross rent index rose 81%)238
whereas the consumer price index rose from 116.3 to 217.4, or 87%.239
The average 1979 unit was superior to the average 1970 unit. It was less
likely to be overcrowded, 24° to lack some or all plumbing,2 4 1 or to be
235 See id at 16 (operating costs rose more rapidly than rents from 1972 through 1978).
236 For example, the number of starts of subsidized rental apartment units was 40,000 in
1975, but had increased to 130,000 units in 1978. This constituted an increase of 225%,
whereas starts of unsubsidized units had increased only 90% during this same period. NAT'L
Assoc. OF HOME BUILDERS, RENTAL HOUSING IN THE 1980's at 63 (1983) (report prepared
by Uriel Manheim for the NAHB).
237 I. LOWRY, RENTAL HOUSING IN THE 1970s: SEARCHING FOR THE CRISES IN RENTAL
HOUSING: IS THERE A CRISIS? 23, 37 (1981).
238 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, .upra note 35, at 10. The "constant quality gross rent in-
dex" compares the gross rents (contract rents plus utilities) for units of equal quality over a
number of years. Id at 9-10.
239 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1981, supra note 205, at 467, table 779.
240 See ingfa p. 566, table IV.
241 See zzfra p. 564, table II.
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otherwise inadequate.242 Table II shows that renter occupied units lack-
ing some plumbing dropped from 8.3% in 1970 to 3.6% in 1979. In
1970, as Table III illustrates, the average age of private nonfarm units in
buildings of five or more units (presumably predominantly rentals) was
18.4 years; by 1979 it had dropped to 17.7 years. Table IV shows that
renters enjoyed more spacious quarters per capita in 1977 than in
1970.243 Thus, renters occupied more space, in newer quarters, with
better facilities. Comparable units rented for less in 1980 than in 1970
(after adjusting for inflation).244 These factors indicate that supply grew
faster than demand in the seventies, thereby depressing rents. No doubt
the increased tenant protections that were developed in the late sixties
and early seventies tended to discourage the preservation or construc-
tion of rental housing and to encourage demand for rental housing.
Their effect, however, was not powerful enough to cause supply to lag
behind demand.
242 For example, in 1970 only 28% of renter occupied units had warm-air furnaces or heat
pumps whereas 38% had these facilities by 1980. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, AND U.S. DEP'T OF HoUS. AND URBAN DEv., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND
RESEARCH, ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEY: 1980, PART A, GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERIS-
TICS 3 (issued Feb. 1982).
243 1. LOWRY, supra note 237, at 26 (providing figures to the same effect: "The average
number of occupied rental rooms per person in rental households rose from 1.32 in 1970 to
1.73 in 1978. The percentage of rental dwellings with more than one person per room fell
from 16.1 to 5.9.").
244 From 1967 to 1980 average gross rent, adjusted for changes in quality, rose 227.2%
whereas the Consumer Price Index (All Items) rose 247.6% for the same period. See I.
LOWRY, supra note 237, at 37.
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2. The Szgnificant Increase in Rent-to-Income Ratios During the Seventies
Was Due Primarily to the Change in Status of Richer Tenants
from Renter to Owner
Even though rents did not rise as fast as the cost of living, median
rent-to-income ratios increased from 20% of income in 1970 to 25% in
1978.245 Constant quality gross rent rose 81% during this period while
median income of renters rose only 59%.246 The increasing rent-to-in-
come ratio resulted from the higher proportion of low income renters.
As one study observed:
Higher income renters have disproportionately become homeowners,
reducing the average income of those who remain renters. Low-in-
come people have always had difficulty paying for rent, evidenced by
high rent-to-income ratios for that group in all time periods. The fact
that low-income renters (with high rent-to-income ratios) are a larger
fraction of the total renter population than formerly has led to a large
part of the apparent decline in the affordability of rental housing.247
Middle and upper income classes represented a larger proportion of the
total renter population in 1970 than in 1980. Table V shows that in
1970 the median income of a renter household was 65% of the average
income of an owner household and that by 1980 that percentage had
fallen to 53%.
TABLE V 248
RENTER AND OWNER MEDIAN INCOME COMPARED
Household Median Income 1980 1970
Owner $19,800 $9,700
Renter $10,500 $6,300
Renter Income as % of Owner Income 53% 65%
Another factor also explains the growth in tenants' rent-to-income
ratios. More of the income for low income tenants came from food
stamps and medicare payments in 1980 than in 1970. These items are
not counted as income when computing average rent-to-income ratios.
If they were, the average rent-to-income ratio for 1980 would decrease
more than would the ratio for 1970.249
245 G. STERNLIEB &J. HUGHES, THE FUTURE OF RENTAL HOUSING 66, exhibit 3 (1981).
246 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, .rura note 35, at 10, table 1.3. See supra note 238 for an
explanation of "constant quality gross rents."
247 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 9.
248 Source for Table V: U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND U.S. DEP'T OF HoUs. AND
URBAN DEV., ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEY: 1980, PART A, GENERAL HOUSING
CHARACTERISTICS 8-9 (Current Housing Reports, Ser. H-150-80, issued Feb. 1982).
249 J. WEICHER, HOUSING: FEDERAL POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 24 (1980). Weicher also
suggests another factor that contributes to the rising rent-to-income ratio:
[A] rising proportion of the elderly have chosen to live apart from their chil-
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Although rent-to-income ratios have increased for the average ten-
ant, reflecting an income mix containing a higher proportion of poor
tenants in 1980 than in 1970, as Table VI illustrates, these ratios have
decreased from 1970 to 1977 for the lowest income quartile of renters.
Thus, if development of the warranty of habitability tended to increase
rental costs for the poorest quartile of society, the effect was not strong
enough to adversely affect their rent-to-income ratios.
To summarize, the rise in rent-to-income ratios from 1970 to 1980
does not indicate a growing shortage in rental housing. Rather, the in-
crease is the result of several other factors, the most significant being the
shrinking proportion of tenants in the upper and middle income
brackets.
3. The Substantial Decrease in Vacancy Rates for Rental Housing
During the Seventies Does Not Indicate a Growing Shortage of
Rental Housing
a. Vacanc Rates Do Not Measure the Magnitude of Unfilled Housing
Needs. (i) Theoretical Analysis. The United States Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development found that "[t]he gross rental vacancy rate
in the nation reached a 23 year low in 1978, of 5.0 percent. . . . It had
moved steadily downward since 1974, and, except for 1977, was signifi-
cantly lower than any annual U.S. rate since data became available in
1956."250
Housing professionals have frequently taken the percentage of va-
cant housing units as a reliable indicator of the degree of housing
shortage or surplus. 25 1 To many observers, a falling vacancy rate sug-
gests increasing shortage; a vacancy rate of less than 5% suggests a hous-
ing problem that justifies strong "remedial" measures, such as rent
dren and families when they retire. The elderly typically have higher ex-
pense/income ratios for housing than those of the rest of the population, in
part because they are able to finance their current expenditures on housing
out of past savings.
Id at 23-24.
250 U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEv., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH,
1980 NATIONAL HOUSING PRODUCTION REPORT 43 (1980).
251 See, e.g., H. SELESNICK, RENT CONTROL xvi (1976) ("A low vacancy rate-perhaps
less than five percent-indicates that a serious shortage exists."); G. STERNLIEB &J. HUGHES,
supra note 240, at 75 ("In general, vacancy rates were far lower at the end of the decade of the
1970s than at the beginning, suggesting that rental demand was growing faster than sup-
ply."); U.S. COMPTROLLER GEN., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
RENTAL HOUSING: A NATIONAL PROBLEM THAT NEEDS IMMEDIATE ATTENTION 5 (1979);
see also DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, CONDOMINIUM CONVER-
SIONS: THE IMPACT OF THE CONDOMINIUM ACT OF 1980 ON TENANTS AND DECLARANTS 5
(Mar. 1, 1982) ("While completely accurate vacancy rates will be unavailable until data is
released by the census, almost every Connecticut community stated a shortage of rental
housing.').
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control.252  In my view, this interpretation of vacancy rates is
unfounded.
When the government accumulates large wheat supplies to imple-
ment a farm support program, does this suggest that the people of the
world have enough to eat? If all of the wheat were distributed to the
poor, would this suggest that the poor were hungrier than when wheat
stockpiles existed? If the answer to these questions is negative, as it obvi-
ously is, then surely it is equally obvious that the existence of large
"stockpiles" of vacant apartments does not necessarily indicate whether
there are many ill-housed people. Suppose that a city had 1,000 living
units of which 100 were vacant (a 10% vacancy factor) and that 100 of
the city's families were homeless. If the 100 vacant units were provided
to the 100 homeless families, the vacancy rate would plummet from 10%
to 0% and the housing problem would disappear. The zero vacancy
factor would reflect good housing conditions, and the high vacancy fac-
tor would coexist with poor housing conditions.
(ii) Empirical Evidence. Ample empirical evidence supports the
proposition that vacancy rates do not measure unfilled housing needs.
(a) Aggregate National Figures. Between 1970 and 1979, vacancy
rates for rental housing fell from 6.8% to 5.5%.253 Yet, during approxi-
mately the same period the number of rental units and rooms grew
faster than the population. Although the renter population increased
only 1%, the number of dwellings available for rent grew by 13.6%, and
the average number of rooms per occupant grew by 12.6%.254 In 1970
the median number of persons per renter occupied unit was 2.3;255 by
1979 it had fallen to 2.0.256 At the same time, rents (after adjustment for
inflation) fell, although landlord expenses were increasing (even after
adjusting for inflation).2 57
All of the above factors, with the exception of the vacancy rate,
suggest that supply increased faster than demand. If the vacancy rate
were truly an indicator of the degree of tightness in supply, it would
have risen during the seventies; that it fell strongly suggests that it is not
a useful indicator of the degree of shortage.
252 See, e.g., Lowe, Los Angeles Faces Up to Rent-Curb Issue, in RENT CONTROL, A SOURCE
BOOK 126, 127 (J. Gilderbloom ed. 1981) ("The proposed (rent) controls should stay in force
as long as the city's low vacancy rate-currently about 2.5%--allows landlords to dominate
the market.").
253 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1981, supra note 205, at 760, table 1372.
254 1. LOWRY, INFLATION, HOUSING COSTS, AND HOUSING CONSUMPTION 1970-80,
figure 3 (Rand Corp. Apr. 1981) (on file with author).
255 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1981, supra note 205, at 760, table 1372.
256 Id
257 See I. LOWRY, supra note 254, figure 1.
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(b) Regional Studies.
TABLE V11 258
RELATION OF CHANGES IN RESIDENTIAL VACANCY RATES
TO CHANGES IN RENTS
Percent Percent
Change in Vacancy Change in Residential
Region Rates, 1978-80 Rent Index, 1978-80
Northeast -19 13.5
North Central 21 15.5
South 13 17.6
West 10 21.4
If falling vacancy rates truly indicated growing shortages, rent increases
for the Northeast should have been greater than for other regions be-
cause the Northeast was the only region with a falling vacancy rate.259
In fact, as indicated by Table VII, the rent increase for the Northeast
was smaller than for the other regions, thus suggesting that vacancy
rates do not measure degrees of shortage. The figures for the other three
regions, however, suggest an inverse correlation between the size of ris-
ing vacancy rates and the size of the increase in rents. With the figures
for three regions suggesting an inverse correlation, and those for one
region not supporting such a correlation, the Table VII figures must be
deemed equivocal. 260
(c) Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) and Central CGa-
ies. A 1980 study found as follows:
There is no consistent relationship between vacancy rates and the
proportion of the rental stock that has been converted [to condomini-
ums] across the 37 largest SMSAs. This means that on an SMSA-
wide basis, levels of conversion may not be associated with either high
or low vacancy rates. . . . [T]here was virtually no difference in aver-
age rental vacancy rates between central cities with high and low
volumes of conversion activity.26 1
Because conversion activity is associated with strong housing de-
258 Adapted from I. LOWRY, supra note 237, at 34. Sources for Table VII: U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT HOUSING REPORTS, ser. H-i 11-79-5, table
I, ser. H-i 11-80-02, table 2; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CPI DETAILED REPORT,
JUNE 1978, table 25, CPI DETAILED REPORT, June 1980, table 23.
259 Rising real rents do not necessarily indicate a growing shortage of rental housing.
They may simply indicate more available real income in the hands of renters or a change in
consumer preference, favoring rental of residential units over other possible expenditures. In
the discussion in the text I have assumed, however, that rising rents indicate a growing tight-
ness in the supply of housing.
260 The large change in the Residential Rent Index for the West and the relatively small
change for the Northeast may simply reflect more new construction and thus higher average
rents in the West, and less new construction and thus lower average rents in the Northeast.
261 CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING, supra note 94, at V-1l.
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mand 262 and is not correlated with vacancies, it appears that vacancy
rates are not correlated with demand.
(d) Local Studies. (1) The Gilderbloom and Applebaum Study. 263
Gilderbloom and Applebaum chose at random fifty small cities, fifty
medium-sized cities, and fifty large cities for their study. Within each
city they determined the vacancy rate and the mean rent. The results of
their study are summarized in Table VIII.264
TABLE VIII
EFFECTS OF CITY SIZE AND RENTAL VACANCY RATE ON
MEDIAN RENT LEVELS: CALIFORNIA CITIES;
1970, U.S. CENSUS
Low Vacancy Rate High Vacancy Rate
Size of City (under 5%) (over 5%)
Small
(2,500-10,000) $ 78 $ 82
(n50)
Medium
(10,000-50,000) $124 $103
(n50)
Large
(over 50,000) $125 $126
(n50)
Means $111 $ 99
(Means are weighted averages which correct for the effects of sam-
pling within city-size categories.)
Table VIII indicates that, for small and large cities, rents were
higher in cities with high vacancy rates than in cities with low vacancy
rates. If low vacancy rates truly indicated the degree of tightness of sup-
ply, precisely the opposite correlation should occur. The association of a
high vacancy factor with lower rents in medium-sized cities simply
serves to emphasize the absence of any correlation between scarcity and
vacancy rates.265
(2) The Davis, Califomia Study. 266 Davis, California, is a town
of approximately 30,000 located in northern California. Most of its resi-
262 See also id at V-32 (correlating condominium conversions with proportion of affluent
renters).
263 Gilderbloom & Applebaum, Why Rents Rie: A Reconsideration, in RENT CONTROL, A
SOURcE BOOK 42 (J. Gilderbloom ed. 1981).
264 Id at 44, table 1.
265 See also I. LOWRY, supra note 237, at 34 ("[I]t appears that relative vacancy rates have
virtually no effect on market rents. .. 2).
266 F. Costello, Davis Apartment Vacancy and Rental Rate Report (Oct. 28, 1982) (an-
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dents are either employees or students of the University of California, or
their dependents. Of those renting in a major residential structure (four
or more units) about 80% are students or their dependents.267 Thus, the
demand for these units is closely related to the student population. In
the fall of 1981, the off-campus student population was approximately
15,660, and the vacancy factor was 0.7%,268 conventionally considered a
very low figure. In the fall of 1982, the off-campus student population
grew to about 15,700, but the vacancy factor also grew to 2.8%.269 Only
one additional living unit of this type (located in structures of four or
more units) was made available during the period in question. In fact,
very few new housing units of any type were built during this period.
Thus, while "housing need" in terms of student population remained
substantially unchanged, vacancies quadrupled despite the lack of con-
struction of new units.
Two phenomena can explain the "puzzle" of increased vacancies
from 1981 to 1982 despite an increased number of students and a con-
struction slowdown. First, reduced effective demand due to generally
depre ssed economic conditions in the fall of 1982 led to less student in-
come that could be spent on housing.270 Second, a rise in the mean
rentai rate for apartment houses of 14.4%271 encouraged students to rent
single family houses or to live outside of Davis. Had landlords lowered
their rents sufficiently instead of raising them, the apartment vacancy
rate undoubtedly would have been reduced instead of quadrupling.
The fourfold increase in the vacancy factor did not indicate less need,
but only less demand in the face of higher rents. Lower than normal
vacancy rates simply indicate asking prices that are lower in relation to
demand compared to some other "normal" time or place.
As indicated in Table IX,27 2 although the density of students per
apartment bedroom was slightly higher in 1976 than in 1979, the va-
cancy rate was 13.5 times greater. Thus, when students were more over-
nual report of the Student Housing Office of the University of California, Davis) [hereinafter
cited as Davis Report].
267 Telephone interview with Fred R. Costello, Associate Director, Student Housing Of-
fice, University of California, Davis (Dec. 16, 1982). The 80% figure is a rough estimate by
Mr. Costello.
268 Davis Report, supra note 266, at 4, table III. See in/ra p. 574, Table IX reproducing
Table III of Davis Report.
269 Davis Report, supra note 266, at 4, table III.
270 In 1982 rental vacancy rates also rose nationwide, from a post World War II low of
under 5% in 1981 to about 5.4% in March 1983. Apparently more people were forced to
share apartments because of the recession. Se Guenther, Rental Vacancies Start Rising Despite
Drop in Construction, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1983, at 29, col. 1.
271 Davis Report, supra note 266, at 4. The number of nonstudent renters may have
decreased, thus leading to increased vacancies, but there is no reason to believe that this in
fact happened.
272 Table IX reproduces, without change, Table III of the Davis Report, supra note 266, at
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crowded the vacancy rate was 13.5 times greater than when they were
less overcrowded. It is difficult to imagine a clearer case to demonstrate
the uselessness of vacancy rates as an indicator of housing need.
b. What Vacancies Measure. Although vacancy factors do not meas-
ure housing needs, they reflect, and can serve as a measure of, the aver-
age gap between landlords' asking prices (AP) and the market
equilibrium (EP) or clearing price. The more AP exceeds EP, the
greater the vacancy factor will be. When EP exceeds AP, the vacancy
rate will approach zero. A third figure, market price (MP), is the actual
rental price to which the parties finally agree. In the normal case, where
AP exceeds EP, MP will fall somewhere below AP and above EP.273
The falling vacancy rate in the seventies suggests that the gap be-
tween AP and EP narrowed during that decade. Several possible scena-
rios could explain the narrowing between AP and EP: (1) AP fell faster
or rose more slowly than EP; (2) AP fell while EP rose; (3) EP rose while
AP remained stable; or (4) AP fell while EP remained stable. Regardless
of which was actually the case, the falling vacancy rate in the seventies
indicates that landlords grew more cautious in setting their asking
prices, relative to the equilibrium price.
c. Reasons for Landlord Caution in Establishing Asking Price. During
the seventies the landlords' legal remedies against defaulting tenants
weakened and their ability to evict or reject "undesirable" tenants
eroded. These developments created an increased incentive for landlords
to pick their tenants more carefully, while simultaneously limiting their
ability to do so legally. The consequences, with the benefit of hindsight,
are now clear. Landlords, barred from overtly discriminating against
"undesirable" or "troublesome" tenants, started to do so covertly.274
Landlords could accomplish this by charging existing desirable tenants
below market rates in an attempt to keep them and to avoid the neces-
sity of covertly using impermissible criteria in choosing new tenants. On
average, landlords asked less than the maximum obtainable rents, in the
hope that this would increase their ability to select and retain desirable
tenants.275 This narrowed the gap between asking price and equilib-
rium price, and consequently reduced vacancy rates.2 76
273 When EP exceeds AP (as in a jurisdiction with rent control), MP will equal AP.
274 See Bishop, "Creative" Rules for Adults-Only Rentals, 14 CALIF. J. 126 (1983) (describing
various strategies widely used by landlords to circumvent legal ban on adults-only rentals).
275 Even when offering a vacant apartment to prospective tenants, a landlord is more
likely under modern landlord-tenant law to shave the price in order to attract a "desirable"
tenant than under the pre-1970 law. By asking a lower rent the landlord will have a wider
array of applicants from which to choose. The weakening of the landlord's ability to deal
quickly and efficiently with tenants who prove troublesome has heightened a landlord's in-
centive to pick a desirable tenant.
276 Two additional factors contributed to narrowing the gap between asking price and
equilibrium price. First, rent control in many communities forced landlords to ask less than
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d. Summao of Vacancy Rate Discussion. The increased tenant protec-
tions developed in the late sixties and early seventies did not result in an
increased shortage of rental housing. The shrinking vacancy rates of
this period, properly interpreted, do not indicate that rental housing
shortages became more severe. The proposition that increased tenant
rights discouraged landlords from constructing or maintaining as much
housing as they otherwise would have is plausible but has been neither
validated nor invalidated by the evidence discussed in the text.2 77 I
have argued, however, that these increased protections (including rent
control) caused landlords to moderate their asking prices, which led to
lower vacancy rates-a result not particularly disadvantageous to
tenants.
4. During the Seventies the Rental Housing Business Became Less
Profitable, and Construction of Rental Housing Units FellRelative to Other Types of Housing
From 1970 to 1980 the operating costs of urban rental properties
rose 240%, while rental revenues for such properties rose only 185%.278
The consequence, of course, was that ownership of rental property be-
came increasingly unprofitable. In constant dollars, net operating re-
turn dropped more than 30%.279 The ratio of operating expenses to
rental revenue rose from 49.7% in 1970 to 64.1% in 1980.280
During the seventies, rental housing starts constituted a diminish-
ing proportion of all housing starts. From 1970 to 1977 the rental stock
grew only half as fast as the owner-occupied stock.281 The percentage of
all occupied units that were renter occupied fell from 37.1% in 1970 to
the market equilibrium price. Second, in an inflationary period rents probably increase more
slowly than other items due to leases and consumer resistance.
277 Based on sophisticated statistical analysis, Professor Werner Hirsch has concluded
that although most habitability laws have not had a measurable effect on the cost of housing,
laws which place grossly substandard apartment houses into receiverships do have a measura-
ble effect. See W. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS, AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 43-58
(1979). See also the excellent pioneering study, Hirsch, Hirsch & Margolis, Regression Analysis
of the Efects ofHabitability Laws Upon Rents, An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar
Debate, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1098 (1975). I make no pretense of being competent to discuss the
statistical methods used by Professor Hirsch. Several other studies have also concluded that
habitability laws have had little discernible effect on the overall quality of housing. See, e.g.,
Brakel & McIntyre, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (URL TA) in Operation, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 555; Mosier & Soble, Modem Legislation, Metropolitan Court, Minis-
cute Results: A Study of Detroit's Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 8 (1973). It is
possible that all of these studies were premature in that they were conducted before there was
sufficient time for the effects of the new legal rules to be reflected in actual housing conditions.
278 1. LOWRY, supra note 254, figure 7.
279 Id figure 8.
280 1. LOWRY, supra note 237, at 38.
281 U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. AND RESEARCH,
1980 NATIONAL HOUSING PRODUCTION REPORT, 2 (1980).
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34.4% in 1980.282
The reduced profitability and associated reduced production of
rental units had several causes. The principal cause was the increasing
preference of high income people for ownership rather than rental sta-
tus. Many people in the seventies were attracted to ownership because
it offered protection from inflation and had significant tax advantages,
especially for those in higher income brackets who could deduct mort-
gage interest from income. After-tax mortgage interest rates were low
compared to inflation, thus offering the practical equivalent of very low-
interest loans.283
Legal developments of the early seventies may have also contrib-
uted to reduced profitability. To the extent that it became more diffi-
cult to evict nonpaying tenants, rental revenues may have been reduced.
Similarly, the inability of a landlord to evict or exclude troublesome
tenants quickly, might reduce the rents he could obtain from other ten-
ants. In many communities rent control also depressed rents. If the
landlord sought to retain control over the selection of his tenants he
would, as explained above, lower his asking price. In addition, the land-
lord's increased duties of maintenance and repair and increased tort lia-
bility exposure might increase operating expenses and reduce profits. I
suspect, however, that the magnitude of these factors on overall profit-
ability was small compared with the basic fact that wealthier persons,
who could afford to pay high rents, were increasingly leaving rental
housing for ownership housing.
C. Summary and Conclusion
The legal developments of the seventies reduced the growth in sup-
ply of rental housing less than the inflation of that period reduced the
growth in demand; supply grew faster than demand despite legal devel-
opments that discouraged some construction. Reduced demand, not
changes in legal doctrine, caused reduced profits.
The declining rental vacancy rate in the seventies requires a differ-
ent explanation. Vacancy rates do not indicate the degree of tightness
in the housing market. The decline in vacancy rates indicates that land-
lords moderated their asking prices in relation to market equilibrium
prices. This moderation was caused, at least in part, by the deteriorat-
ing legal position of landlords. Thus, it appears that through a unique
282 Derived from U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEP'T OF HoUs. AND URBAN DEv.,
ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEY: 1980, PART A, GENERAL HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 1, table
A-1 (Current Housing Reports, Ser. H-150-80, issued Feb. 1982).
283 In 1974, 1975, and 1979, for example, the rate of inflation, as measured by the Con-
sumer Price Index, equaled or exceeded the average mortgage rate for conventional new
home loans. Compare STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1981, supra note 205, at 459, table 767 (CPI)
with id at 523, table 876 (mortgage rates).
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concatenation of historical events, the major statistically measurable ef-
fect of the previous decade's legal developments has been a lowering of
the vacancy rate. This reflects an increased landlord predisposition to
favor existing tenants whom landlords deem desirable over new tenants
who might have characteristics that landlords deem undesirable. It is
doubtful that the legal reformers of the seventies would have welcomed
this bittersweet result.
In short, although certain statistics appear to suggest that changes
in housing conditions resulted from changes in legal doctrine, they in
fact offer little support for this proposition. The highly plausible theory
that increased tenant protections, other things remaining equal, would
reduce the supply of rental housing has been neither proved nor dis-
proved by the evidence discussed in this article. Other things did not
remain equal.
IV
EVALUATION
Was the revolution in landlord-tenant law good or bad for low in-
come tenants? The empirical data discussed in Part III of this article
provides no basis upon which to make a judgment. The supply of rental
housing would probably have been greater had none of the changes oc-
curred. 28 4 It is uncertain, however, how much greater it would have
been. Did the loss of an unknown quantity of rental units outweigh all
or some of the benefits accruing from the revolution in landlord-tenant
law? Lacking a satisfactory empirical basis to resolve this question, one
must rely on theory.
A. Competition in the Rental Housing Industry
I start with the proposition that the rental housing industry is in-
tensely competitive. More than half of all living units offered for rent
are in buildings with fewer than five units. 2 8 5 Ownership of such units is
surely diffuse. Even as regards larger apartment buildings, few land-
lords wield any significant degree of monopoly power. 28 6 In addition to
competing with other rental units, landlords compete with ownership
284 Increased tenant protections probably reduced the profitability of rental housing and
thus the supply. It is conceivable, however, that without these protections, tenants would
have fled rental housing to become owners at an even faster rate than they did. If this hap-
pened the supply of rental housing might have grown even more slowly.
285 As of 1978, 14.6 million of the nation's 26.9 million rental units were in structures
containing less than five units. G. STERNLIEB & J. HUGHES, supra note 245, at 59.
286 In New York City no private owner owns as much as five percent of the rental apart-
ments in the city. Hazlett, Rent Controls and the Housing Crisis, in RESOLVING THE HOUSING
CRISIS 277, 293 (M. Johnson ed. 1982) (quoting Roger Starr, member of the New York Times
editorial board). The Hazlett article is a brief, cogent, and recent analysis of the weaknesses
of rent control.
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units and mobile homes. In a strongly competitive market, a laissez-
faire policy will normally obtain maximum efficiency in the use of eco-
nomic resources. This general rule has, however, a well-known excep-
tion: the doctrine of social cost.
B. Social Cost
Although a rental agreement between landlord and tenant that in-
jures others may reflect an optimum arrangement for the parties in-
volved, the costs imposed on others may make the transaction inefficient
for society. Because of transaction costs, those injured by the arrangement
may not be able within reasonable economic limitations to persuade
landlord and tenant to modify their arrangement. At least one econo-
mist, Weitzman, has used the social cost argument to justify enforcing
an implied warranty of habitability with a repair and deduct remedy. 287
He argues that slums impose a social cost in terms of increased crime,
accidents, and disease. Therefore, even if a landlord and tenant freely
and knowingly agree to lease a slum, the transaction is not efficient
when one accounts for the cost to society. The weakness of this argu-
ment is that little evidence exists that under modern American condi-
tions slums actually produce crime, disease, or other negative
externalities. That slum-dwellers suffer from these ills to a greater de-
gree than other people scarcely proves that poor housing is the major
source. The few available studies do not suggest a clear causative con-
nection between substandard housing and social or physiological
pathology. 288
Although the free market in rental housing promotes economic effi-
ciency, this does not mean that the law as it existed in 1960 was better
than that which exists today.
287 Weitzman, The Impact of Repair and Deduct Legislation: An Economic Anaosis, 11
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 985, 989 (1978); see also Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071, 1079-80 (D.C. Cir.) ("[P]oor housing is detrimental to the whole society, not merely to
the unlucky ones who must suffer the daily indignity of living in a slum."), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
288 See generally Glazer, The E.fects of Poor Housing, in HOUSING URBAN AMERICA 164 (J.
Pynoos, R. Schafer & C. Hartman 2d ed. 1980). Grossly inadequate housing, such as housing
that lacks major facilities or that is not weathertight, clearly does have an adverse effect on
the health, behavior, or attitude of the inhabitants. A. SCHORR, SLUMS & SOCIAL INSECU-
RITY 20 (1964). But as indicated, supra p. 542 Table I, such housing is relatively rare in the
United States. It is less clear whether poor, but not grossly deficient, housing has such adverse
effects on the inhabitants. Id It is even less clear whether such housing has a substantial
deleterious effect on neighboring communities, or on society in general. This is not to suggest
that a slum community does not have an adverse effect on a neighboring community. I only
question whether a neighboring community would benefit substantially if slum housing were
replaced by standard housing, but all other conditions remained the same.
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C. Warranties of Habitability Based on Implied Agreement in
Fact
An efficient and just legal system protects the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties to a contract. When government polices the honesty
of the weights and measures that a merchant uses, it is fulfilling this role.
Similarly, when the parties to a lease reasonably expect that the land-
lord will make needed repairs, courts should enforce this expectation
even if it is based on an agreement implied in fact rather than expressed.
If a landlord shows premises without mentioning that they are infested
with vermin, he is impliedly representing that there are no vermin and
this representation should be enforced. 289 If a landlord shows premises
with a toilet, he is impliedly representing, under modern American con-
ditions, that it is in working condition and that he will keep it in re-
pair.29° Courts should enforce this representation.
D. Warranties of Habitability Not Based on Implied Agreement
in Fact
A very different situation arises, however, when the law enforces a
duty on which the parties did not in fact agree, and on which they
would not have agreed if the question had been posed to them directly.
For example, if the tenant agrees to rent an apartment with patent code
violations, and there is no implied agreement that the landlord will re-
pair these violations, enforcing a duty to repair despite the implied
agreement of the parties to the contrary would not serve the tenant's
welfare. Denying the tenant the option of renting a substandard unit at
a substandard price is not a benefit to the tenant if standard units at
rents he can afford are unavailable. During the seventies, the expanded
rent subsidy program known as section 8 shielded many low income ten-
ants from the adverse effects of a vigorous code enforcement program.29'
As such subsidy programs are cut back, the desirability of vigorous code
enforcement may become more doubtful.
289 Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
290 See Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
291 The § 8 program was enacted by the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201, 88 Stat. 633, 662-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The § 8 program provides rent subsidies to low and moder-
ate income families. These subsidies cover the difference between what the family can afford
for rent and the market price for rental units in the locality. Under the Existing Housing
Program of § 8, tenants find rental housing in the private market and a government agency
makes the subsidy payment to the landlord on behalf of the tenant. Under the New Con-
struction and Substantial Rehabilitation Programs the federal government guarantees to pri-
vate developers, prior to construction or rehabilitation, that it will provide subsidies to
eligible households seeking to rent the new or rehabilitated units.
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E. Rent Control
The theoretical and practical objections to rent control laws have
been ably and thoroughly explained elsewhere. However, a word or two
may profitably be directed to some of the leading defenders of modern
"second generation" rent control. These writers claim that modern rent
control laws that allow moderate increases in rents are unobjectionable
to reasonable landlords and beneficial to tenants. 292 Of course, "moder-
ate" rent control ordinances allowing some rent increases do less harm
than "immoderate" rent control laws allowing no rent increases. The
less the rent control law controls rent, the less harm it does. If there
were no rent control law, no harm at all would be done. By depressing
prices, rent control increases demand and restricts the supply of rental
housing, thereby exacerbating the very shortage the effects of which it
was designed to ameliorate.
Some modern rent control laws do not attempt to control the rents
of units constructed after the passage of the ordinance. It has been as-
serted that new construction in jurisdictions with such laws proceeds as
rapidly as in comparable jurisdictions without rent control. 293 Assuming
that this is true, the explanation hardly constitutes a basis for enacting
rent control. Residential rental construction in towns neighboring a
rent control town may be discouraged by the possibility that the neigh-
boring town will adopt similar rent control laws and apply them to
rental property built shortly before the passage of the ordinance.
The most well-known study arguing that rent control does not dis-
courage housing construction is the Harbridge House study of 1974.294
The Harbridge House study has been severely criticized both for its
method and its conclusions. 295 Even if one were to accept its central
conclusion that new rental construction is not discouraged by rent con-
trol, this sheds no light on whether rent control tends to exacerbate a
housing shortage. A shortage of rental housing is just as severe whether
the cause is artificially depressed prices resulting in increased demand or
decreased supply.
Exempting new construction from rent control may actually lead to
more new construction than there would be in the absence of rent con-
trol. By depressing the price of living space, rent control encourages
292 See, e.g., E. ACHTENBERG, THE SOCIAL UTILITY OF RENT CONTROL (1971); H.
SELESNICK, RENT CONTROL (1976); Gilderbloom, Rent Controls [sic] Impact on the Quatiy and
Quantity of the Housing Stock, in RENT CONTROL, A SOURCE BOOK 137 (. Gilderbloom ed.
1981).
293 See H. SELESNICK, supra note 292, at 30-38; Gilderbloom, supra note 292, at 140-41.
294 This has been published as H. SELESNICK, supra note 292.
295 See J. KAIN, EVALUATION OF THE STERNLIEB AND HARBRIDGE HOUSE REPORTS ON
RENT CONTROL IN MASSACHUSETTS, POLICY NOTE 74-2 (Dep't of City & Regional Plan-
ning, Harvard Univ. 1974); G. STERNLIEB, THE REALITIES OF RENT CONTROL IN THE
GREATER BOSTON AREA (1974).
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tenants to use more space than they otherwise would. This waste of
space will create a demand for new construction that would not exist
without rent control. Because the key objection to rent control is its
creation of shortages by encouraging waste, that these shortages may
actually stimulate new construction is hardly a recommendation. 2 96
F. Condominium Conversions
Condominium conversion laws are another example of laws that do
not protect any real agreement, implied or express, of the parties. Be-
cause condominium living imposes no greater negative externalities
than rental living, condominium conversion laws cannot be justified by
a social cost argument.
Condominium conversion legislation is class legislation, benefiting
existing tenants at the expense of condominium buyers and landlords.
Even if one ignores the interests of landlords, it is difficult to justify most
condominium conversion legislation. It is true, of course, that some ten-
ants who would be displaced by condominium conversion legislation are
old and disabled and would find it a hardship if forced to move, but
many do not face such difficulties. In addition, many condominium
purchasers may themselves be old or disabled. There is no apparent
reason why the class of condominium purchasers are any less worthy of
consideration than the class of tenants.
Even if one wished to prefer the welfare of tenants to the exclusion
of any other consideration, it is difficult to justify condominium conver-
sion laws. In many cases, a developer builds an apartment house in-
tending first to rent it to tenants and then convert it to condominiums.
Condominium conversion legislation makes this process more difficult
and sometimes impossible. Closing off this avenue of profit will mean
fewer new buildings offered for rentals, a result hardly beneficial to ten-
ants in the long run.
G. Exculpatory and Other Clauses in Leases
The most difficult area for evaluation is that of exculpatory and
waiver clauses in leases. Suppose a form lease offered by the landlord
contains clauses in which the tenant waives his right to a habitable
apartment and to sue for personal injuries caused by the landlord's neg-
ligence. Although one might be tempted to conclude that if the tenant
read, understood, and signed the lease the repugnant clause should be
enforced, this conclusion is erroneous.
The key factor here is the existence of heavy transaction and infor-
mation costs. A potential tenant searching for an apartment to rent typ-
296 Because rent control causes a housing shortage, the rents charged for units in the new
construction will be higher than they would be for comparable units without rent control.
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ically spends several days comparing price, physical facilities, and
required duration of the lease. During this period, he rarely sees a writ-
ten lease. Only when he finally decides on an apartment will he actu-
ally see the lease. At this point, the prospective tenant has no ready
means of shopping for lease terms. He does not know, and cannot
readily find out, what types of leases other landlords are offering. Be-
cause of the widespread use of printed lease forms, a prospective tenant
is fully justified in suspecting that most landlords will be offering identi-
cal lease clauses on identical lease forms. The cost of searching and find-
ing more favorable lease clauses, and of weighing their value as against
other factors contributing to the value of a proposed apartment, will
usually exceed the benefits to be gained.
Standard form leases are usually drawn to appeal to the landlords
who purchase such forms, and their widespread use constitutes, in effect,
a severe impediment to competition for renters on the basis of different
lease clauses. Moreover, most rental agents are not authorized to modify
the lease clauses used.
The tenant seeking to modify such clauses thus faces heavy transac-
tion and information costs and a practical absence of competition
among landlords concerning the terms of such clauses. There are also
heavy costs in time and energy that have been expended in choosing a
particular apartment before the prospective tenant has an opportunity
to examine the lease. Given these market defects, courts should refuse to
enforce unfair exculpatory clauses or waivers of legal rights that are not
the product of truly effective bargaining.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Certain types of legislation, such as rent control and condominium
conversion legislation, are undesirable. They reject the bargain that the
parties actually entered into with full knowledge of the facts and impose
another bargain to which at least one of the parties would never have
agreed. Included in this category are warranties of habitability that are
implied in law but to which the parties did not agree and to which they
would not have agreed had their attention been drawn to the issue.
Other reforms of the seventies, such as the enforcement of implied
in fact warranties and promises to repair, were desirable. In these cases,
the law is simply enforcing the actual but unexpressed agreement of the
parties.
Exculpatory clauses and waivers of tenants' rights in leases raise
more subtle problems. The parties have apparently agreed on these
clauses. Yet, because of the institutional framework surrounding the
leasing transaction, the bargaining is illusory, and courts should not en-
force the clause.
Finally, landlords often oppose legislation prohibiting discrimina-
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tion against women, children, homosexuals, students, or racial minori-
ties. Such statutes may reduce the profits of landlords and to this extent
discourage the production or preservation of rental housing. Yet their
cost in these terms is justified by the noneconomic goals that they
achieve. Justice, after all, has never been costless.
